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This dissertation examines the expectations impact of the “Belt and Road 
initiative “in Egypt economic and foreign policy. Particularly, that the ‘BRI’ has 
become the focal point of China’s national strategy. However, the objective of 
BRI is a subject heavily debated by think tanks, academia, and public media since 
it’s begun. 
This study investigates the current trends in Chinese outward foreign 
direct investment since the initiation of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative by the 
Chinese government in 2013. For China, meanwhile, strategic interest in Egypt 
was also growing. Unlike China’s other Middle Eastern partners, ties with Egypt 
are not motivated by oil imports, but by a more geographic calculus. The Suez 
Canal has long been China’s primary shipping route for sending goods to Europe, 
China’s largest market. As a result, China has been eager to increase its presence 
in the crucial canal for decades. 
 
This study examine Egypt’s political situation with explanations of 
Egypt’s revolutions history and the Arab Spring in addition to the motives behind 
Egypt’s revolution in 2011. Furthermore, explanation for Egypt’s economic 
perspective, Egypt’s ODA and Egypt’s economic, political, and social challenges. 
The study additional examines the motivation behind a comprehensive 
strategic partnership between China and Egypt, particularly in terms of the 
prorated slump in United State power and influence in the Middle East. In point 
of fact, it is expected that China can profit successively by acquisition a foothold 
within the Middle East.  
This study found a significant potential benefit for Egypt with the chance 
to function as the “hub” for the BRI into Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese 
have already selected it as one of the top 5 countries for acquisitions and mergers 
potential over the following 5 years. The Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone) 
could play a significant role for China as well by transferring Chinese production 
to the nations with substantial imports. 
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In one hand, the objective of BRI is a subject heavily debated by think 
tanks, academia, and public media since it’s begun. On the other hand, the 
Egyptian government faces a lot of challenges to meet the continuing demands of 
Egyptians after the 2011 uprising in Egypt; a lot of protesters demands stay 
unachieved. So, in order to examine our thesis subject, The study will be based on 
three chapters: In Chapter II, we spotlighted on Egypt’s political situation with 
explanations of Egypt’s revolutions history and the Arab Spring which started in 
late 2010 as created dramatic changes throughout the Middle East countries, also 
we defined the motives behind Egypt’s revolution in 2011 beside with the role of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces in Egypt’s Economy. Furthermore, we explained 
Egypt’s economic perspective in addition to Egypt’s ODA and Egypt’s economic, 
political, and social challenges 
The chapter III based on three parts; the first part spotlight on the 
significance of the BRI started from the history of the Silk Road in one hand then 
move to the announcement of the current initiative. Otherwise the implications of 
the initiative through China’s objectives, vision, and which countries are 
participated. The second part illustrates China’s major foreign policy towards the 
initiative and the Security Implications, Moreover to examine the initiative 
through realistic and liberal lenses. The third part focuses on the BRI dimension 
8 
 
and the progress that has been made by China, Furthermore explanation of the 
implementation of Djibouti port and Gwadar Sea Port. 
Chapter V, we examined the relation between Egypt and China through 
political and economic paths. Firstly, the political path we spotlight on the history 
of the relation between the two countries which was started from the first 
Egyptian revolution in modern history precisely led by president Naser. Then we 
shift to China’s culture approach to strengthen its relationship with Egypt and the 
Middle East countries. Moreover, we elaborated China and Egypt comprehensive 
strategic partnership. Secondly, the economic path as we detailed the role of the 
BRI initiative and the Suez Canal with exploring the trade and investment projects 
between the two countries. Finally, the last chapter which includes the conclusion 
Purpose of the research 
      The study examines the motivation of the BRI initiative and expectation about 
its impact on Egypt economy and foreign policy. This study investigates the 
current trends in Chinese outward foreign direct investment since the initiation of 
the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative by the Chinese government in 2013 
        For China, meanwhile, strategic interest in Egypt was also growing. Unlike 
China’s other Middle Eastern partners, ties with Egypt are not motivated by oil 
imports, but by a more geographic calculus. The Suez Canal has long been 
China’s primary shipping route for sending goods to Europe, China’s largest 
market. As a result, China has been eager to increase its presence in the crucial 
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canal for decades The study additional examines the motivation behind a 
comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Egypt, and its impact on 
Egypt’s economy and foreign policy also how China 
could profit successively from acquisition a foothold in the Middle East.  
     Definitions of terms 
        BRI initiative: It’s a mouthful. The “One Belt” part of it refers to the Silk 
Road Economic Belt while the “One Road” refers to the 21st-century Maritime 
Silk Road. Jointly, they’re meant to be a revival of the ancient Silk Road trading 
routes. China says the project is open to everyone, but it has also identified 65 
countries along the Belt and Road. 
Research Question 
 
➢ Could China’s Belt and Road Initiative be the rescue plan for Egypt 
economy? 
➢ What are the expectations of BRI initiative on Egypt economy and foreign 
policy? 
➢ Why Sisi administration believes that relations with China to be 
fundamental? 




Relevant background literature 
 
    The literature regarding the BRI is comparatively broad as the project was 
discovered only five years ago. Through my study, the literature on this topic is 
principally divided into: 
         Firstly, the perspective and motivation of the Silk Road such as (Romana 
2017),(Giuseppe 2017) and (Hill 2016) which is part of different scholars study 
on the OBOR initiative on behalf to different articles and Chinese reports.  
      Secondly, China Africa relation such as (Uche 2013),(Keiran 2009) and (Jian 
2008) which is dealing more with the historical relation, motivation and mutual 
benefits. 
      Thirdly, Egypt economic and foreign policy such as (Marwa 2017) and 
(Assem 2012) also this part have numerous and diversified studies, but we will 
spotlight on Egypt after the 2011 revolution which represents the new and current 
trend of Egypt economic and foreign policy. 
    In addition to journal articles, statistical analyses of World Bank, OECD, and 
relevant academic references all these sources are analyzed through a different 
perspective and it is substantially corroborative materials, but still missing the 
expectation of the OBOR initiative on Egypt economic and foreign policy.  
The significance of the research 
 
The study will try to fill the gap of the missing studies about the 
expectation of the BRI on Egypt economic and foreign policy ,be focus more on 
Egypt perspective towards BRI particularly the period that followed the June 30th 
revolution, witnessed an alternation in the political system, resulting in a review 
of all policies, especially the Egyptian foreign policy which resulted in a shift 
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towards the east in an attempt to restore balance in the Egyptian foreign policy 
after it remained western oriented for several decades. 
      This paper seeks to measure the impact of BRI on the Sino-Egyptian relations 
up to date, using several indicators among which is: the economic factor, cultural 
and educational exchange. 
Research Methodology 
 
The thesis is a qualitative analysis instead of a quantitative analysis also 
it’s a descriptive research based on IR theories, with a theoretical frame to analyze 
China’s motivations behind the BRI and its impact on Egypt’s economy and 
foreign policy. In sight of the extensive political and economic implications of 
BRI, the extent of the study is national, regional, and global. The study depends 
on the descriptive analytical approach, Comparative approach, and content 
analysis tool. 
Anticipated problems and limitations 
 
Actually, the time limit is one of the crucial obstacles for this study; also 
collecting the data from our home country is totally very limited which is 




The study is proscribed to the scope that the BRI may be permanent 







Egypt’s Political and Economic Situation 
 
I - Egypt Political Situation 
1.1 – Egypt’s revolutions history 
Egyptian history has a long-standing relationship with rebellion and 
revolution. In 1821, over 20,000 peasants revolted in the south of Egypt against 
increasing taxation, forced labor, and an unprecedented conscription policy. 1 
Another three peasant uprisings took place in 1822, 1844, and 1863.2 From 1879 
to 1882, Egyptians rose up in a nationwide revolution seeking to limit the power 
of the monarchical military state with a constitution.3 The British navy came to 
the aid of the monarchy, bombed Alexandria, and defeated the revolutionary 
troops, commencing a seventy-year-long military occupation.4  
Yet, a nationalist revolution shook the country in the spring and summer 
of 1919, protesting against the Paris Peace Conference and demanding 
independence and a constitution.5 Despite the non-violent nature of the revolution, 
                                                          
1 Khaled Fahmy, "How the Egyptian Revolution Began, and Where It Might End – Khaled Fahmy | Aeon 
Essays," Aeon, Novmber 3, 2015. Accessed June 22, 2018., https://aeon.co/essays/how-the-egyptian-
revolution-began-and-where-it-might-end. 
2 The 1822 peasant uprising was quashed by the government’s machine guns under the command of 
Muhammad Ali. Both the 1822 and the 1844 uprisings were in the Delta. Ibid. 
3 The revolution was led by Ahmed Urabi. Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 




British forces killed over 800 Egyptians. 6  The British finally terminated the 
protectorate in 1922, formally recognizing King Fuad as the sovereign of Egypt 
while maintaining key restrictions on Egyptian independence to protect their 
interests.7 For instance, the British interfered with the drafting of the constitution, 
enabling the crown (their allies) to dominate parliament.8  
 
         After the humiliation of Israel’s victory in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, there 
was an upsurge of tension against the government of King Farouk.9 In January of 
1952, British forces crushed nationalist protests in the Suez Canal area, leading to 
widespread riots in Cairo.10 The Muslim Brotherhood, who actively participated 
in the riots, communicated secretly with the clandestine group of Free Officers 
through Anwar Sadat, one of the founding officers.11 On July 23, 1952, eighty 
Free Officers took control of the army, arresting almost all of the generals.12 King 
Farouk was deposed and exiled; Egypt’s constitutional monarchy was overthrown. 
Sadat read the declaration of the revolution broadcasted on national radio:  
 
 
We have undertaken to clean ourselves up and have appointed to command us 
men from the army whom we trust in their ability, their character, and their 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. The British government maintained some control over communications, defense, policy on Sudan, 
protection of minorities, and British interests 
8 Fahmy, “The Long Revolution.” 
9 Filiu, From the Deep State to Islamic State: the Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihad Legacy, 33. 
10 Ibid, 34 
11 Ibid,34 
12 Filiu, 35. 
14 
 
patriotism. It is certain that all Egypt will meet this news with enthusiasm and 
will welcome it.13 
The Free Officers turned to General Mohammad Naguib, one of the few 
generals not arrested on July 1952, who became president in June 1953.14 After a 
failed (and probably staged) assassination attempt against Nasser by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Alexandria, the regime cracked down on the Brotherhood.15 In 
response to the assassination attempt against Nasser, approximately 20,000 
members were arrested, many without a trial, and President Naguib was placed 
under house arrest for the rest of his life, accused of taking part in the 
assassination plot. 16  In January of 1954, Nasser dissolved the Muslim 
Brotherhood claiming that it was seeking to overthrow the regime. Arguably, 
1954 marked the consolidation of Nasser’s place as the undisputed leader of the 
revolutionary government.17 
From the outset, Nasser established a military, authoritarian regime that 
successfully cultivated mass support.18 The coup replaced the old elites with a 
presidential regime, an emerging class of military officers and bureaucrats of 
middle- class origin, and a one-party system.19 Since parliament was disbanded, 
the one-party system was a crucial innovation, as it maintained the regime’s 
leadership informed of the needs of Egyptian society as it brought all politics 
                                                          
13 Ibid, 35.   
14 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Sean L. Yom, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017).375. 
15 Filiu, 50. 
16 Ibid, 50.  
17 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015).27.   
18 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 568. 
19 Ibid, 568 
15 
 
under the direction of Nasser himself.20 This system was centered in the Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU), the only political party allowed under the Nasser regime, 
created in 1962; as a political institution, Nasser’s single-party system controlled 
trade unions, universities, and the media while maintaining a patronage network 
in the bureaucracy of the legal system stretching from the cities to the Egyptian 
countryside.21 
After Egypt was defeated in the 1967 War against Israel, Nasser was 
unable to regain the Sinai Peninsula and restore Egyptian territorial integrity lost 
in the Six Day War.22 In September 1970, Nasser died of a heart attack; more than 
five million Egyptians gathered in the streets to mourn the death of a beloved and 
controversial leader.23 
         The Egyptian army, under Sadat’s leadership, was able to shatter the 
perception of Israeli military superiority following the Egyptian defeat in the Six-
Day War of 1967. Under Sadat, the Egyptian economy turned away from 
socialism, as it incorporated neo-liberal economic policies.24 
         Although Sadat inherited Nasser’s political institutions, he altered them to 
ensure they would follow his directives.25 He obliterated the Arab Socialist Union 
and forged a new political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which in 
                                                          
20 Ibid,568. 
21 "Hazem Kandil: Sisi's Egypt. New Left Review 102, November-December 2016.," New Left Review, , 
accessed May 22, 2018,https://newleftreview.org/II/102/hazem-kandil-sisi-s-egypt. 
22 Ibid, 53 
23 Jack Shenker, The Egyptians: a Radical History (St. Ives Plc: Allen Lane, 2016), 40.   
24 Lapidus, 42-46. I consciously use the word neo-liberalism following the example of Jack Schenker and Ira 
Lapidus because I think that the Sadat period of Egyptian history begins the transition from socialism under 
Nasser and a neo-liberalism under Mubarak 
25 Joshua Stacher, 51. 
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practice was an extension of the executive office.26 Sadat created a new capitalist 
class that was dependent on him by opening up the market and generated more 
opportunities for private wealth accumulation.27 These emerging elite included 
contractors, speculators in housing, and import-exporters.28 When Sadat severely 
diminished food subsidies by millions of Egyptian pounds at the behest of the 
World Bank in January 1977, mass strikes erupted in two of Cairo’s industrial 
districts and widespread violence swept Egyptian cities.29 But he was then forced 
to reverse his cuts fewer than two days after announcing them.30 Despite Sadat’s 
efforts in crafting these economic reforms, the Egyptian economy was still reliant 
on tourism, remittances, and the Suez Canal tolls. 31  Thus, the government 
retreated from the promises of welfare it had made in the 1960s. 
In October 1981, Muslim radicals assassinated Sadat during a public 
military parade in Cairo commemorating the 1973 War with Israel. It is within 
this context that Hosni Mubarak—Sadat’s vice-president, chief of the air force, 
and the man sitting next to Sadat when he was killed—took office.32 
In contrast with Nasser but similar to Sadat, Mubarak sought to control 
rather than stifle political opposition or criticism entirely. Although he allowed 
protests on university campuses regarding foreign policy issues, like the 
American invasion of Iraq, Mubarak also allowed private media channels, 
newspapers, and talk shows to criticize him occasionally. Political sociologist, 
                                                          
26 Ibid, 164-65 
27 Shenker, 40. 
28 Lapidus, 571.   
29 Ibid, 46.   
30 Shenker, 46. 
31 Lapidus, 570   
32 Lapidus, 571.   
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Hazem Kandil posits that these avenues for controlled criticism became proxies 
for political activism that worked to bring down Mubarak.33 
     1.2 - Arab Spring and Egypt 2011 
         Inspired by the success of the Tunisian protests that led President Ben Ali to 
flee to Saudi Arabia, Riding the wave of revolution, millions of Egyptians 
gathered in cities on January 25, 2011. At the outset, the tensions were high 
between police forces and the protestors. They took harsh precautions against 
these tensions, applying riot-control strategies, and prevented all types of 
communication. However, protests had gathered again by January 28, and the 
police had moved back. As the pressure on President Hosni Mubarak increased, 
the scale of the demonstrations kept rising, mainly at organized Friday gatherings. 
         On February 11, 2011, after eighteen days of mass protests throughout 
Egypt, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced President Mubarak resignation, 
tasking the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) with managing the 
nation.34 Through a few weeks of mass demonstrations, the Egyptian people had 
exercised their collective sovereignty and forced out an autocrat who had 
maintained power for thirty years. 
Yet, by ousting Mubarak, the military, as a major part of the Egyptian 
deep state, sacrificed only the head of the regime in an attempt to maintain 
power. 35  The provisional government and the security forces maintained a 
                                                          
33 Kandil 
34 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015),54. 
35 The term, deep state refers to the undergirding structure that manages state action. The Egyptian deep state 




confrontational posture towards continuing strikes and demonstrations.36 SCAF 
also gave itself executive control exceeding that of the incoming president, as 
well as immunity from oversight, and control over the national budget.37 The 
Freedom and Justice Party- Muslim Brotherhood’s- had early successes: in 
January 2012, it won 47.2% of the seats in parliament; in June, Muhammad Morsi 
became the first democratically elected President of Egypt.38 Morsi’s government 
and the deep state began to engage in an existential political war over the 
construction and rules of the new government.39 
The Brotherhood isolated themselves, appointing only their members to 
crucial posts at all levels of government, and abused presidential decrees, while 
the military and the deep state accumulated legislative, judicial and electoral 
power seeking to undermine the Brotherhood’s rule. Moreover, the Egyptian 
economy was in a deep crisis: the value of the currency had dropped ten percent 
by the spring of 2013; tourism plummeted, and fuel shortages in May had resulted 
in long lines at gasoline stations, higher food prices, and electricity blackouts. 40 
The Tamarod (Rebellion) movement, which began in March 2013, aimed 
to gather 15 million signatures calling for Morsi’s resignation.41 In contrast with 
the revolution of 2011, Tamarod’s more subdued emphasis on “rebellion” against 
Morsi’s government could accommodate the concerns of the Egyptian elite that 
were formed during the Mubarak era. After the police and state officials had 
openly supported the movement, Tamarod announced it had gathered an 
                                                          
36 Gelvin, 71-2. 
37 Gelvin, 71-3. 
38 Ibid, 64. 
39 Ibid, 75-6.   
40 Ibid, 77. 
41 Filiu, 173.   
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unverifiable 22 million signatures on June 30, 2013. The pressure on Morsi was 
mounting. 
On June 30, the anniversary of his ascendance to the presidency, hundreds 
of thousands of protesters against and for Morsi took to the street. The army 
issued an ultimatum the next day, giving Morsi forty-eight hours to offer a plan to 
share power or confront military intervention.                             On July 3, 
three out of five founding members of Tamarod met with General Sisi.42 Shortly 
thereafter, the army arrested Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president. 
All the while, Sisi asserted that the coup was apolitical in a press statement: 
 
        The armed forces could not close their eyes to the movement and demands 
of the masses calling them to play a national role, not a political role, as the 
armed forces will be the first to proclaim that they will stay away from politics…. 
[The army] will confront with all its might, in cooperation with the ministry of 
interior, any violation of public peace.12443 
 
 
          This excerpt from Sisi’s statement depicts the military once again as the 
reluctant guardian of the people, who hesitantly answers the people’s plea for 
protection. Similar to Nasser’s recollections in Egypt's Liberation: The 
Philosophy of the Revolution, Sisi caveats the military’s involvement in politics 
by implying that this involvement is not only temporary but also necessary for the 
betterment of Egypt.44 Like the opening salvo to the 1952 coup read by Sadat on 
national radio, the tone of the statement is forceful in its assertion that the 
military’s action preceding and proceeding the speech are indisputably aligned 
with public interests.  
                                                          
42 Ibid.   
43 Filiu, 175. 




Yet, after retiring from the military, Sisi was elected president with an 
abysmal 47% voter turnout—the population seemed to be suffering from election 
fatigue and disillusionment.45 
After enormous protests with millions marching in the country 30 June 
2013, most Egyptians expected the army to do its national security duty and save 
the country from economic ruin. The military responded to the people’s demands 
and formed a collation with public figures and quite a few political parties to 
depose “topple over” Morsi on 3 July.2013. 
          Soon after ousting Morsi, the security forces began a violent repressive 
campaign targeting the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. 
On August 13, 2013, at 7 am, the security forces opened fire without warning on a 
sprawling tent-city outside the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque in East Cairo. Human 
Rights Watch documented at least 817 deaths and more than a thousand 
individuals injured.  The army ceased being the guardian of the people’s “Tahrir 
dream” as it mobilized the entire security apparatus against any dissent. 46 
Arguably, a harsher military authoritarian regime than Mubarak’s has been 
established. Had the revolution failed? Could it even be called a revolution? 
However, particularly in 2011, Egyptians used their imagination to construct 
different “forms of life” in which they became citizens of their country with an 
active and powerful political voice, no longer the subjects of an autocrat. In an 
imperfect continuation of Nasser’s, Sadat’s, and Mubarak’s regimes, the military 
                                                          
45 Gelvin,80.   




and the deep state sought to de-legitimize the Brotherhood, depicting them as 
religious extremists endangering the goals of the revolution.  
The preamble to the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 provides a glimpse 
into how the Sisi regime is seeking to represent itself within the context of 
Egyptian history. First, whenever the revolution of 2011 is mentioned in the 
preamble, it is conceptualized together with the coup of 2013: “‘Jan 25—June 30’ 
Revolution.” 47  This phrasing insinuates that the contemporary Sisi regime 
represents itself as the incarnation of the goals of 2011. The preamble places the 
“‘Jan 25—June 30’ Revolution” within the context of the revolution of 1919 and 
1952, arguing that 1952 “represents an extension of the revolutionary march of 
Egyptian patriotism, and supports the strong bond between the Egyptian people 
and their patriotic army that bore the trust and responsibility of protecting the 
homeland. 
         Once more, the motif of the military as the guardian of the people appears 
in a medium sanctioned by the regime. After conveniently skipping over 
Mubarak’s thirty-year regime, the preamble praises “‘Jan 25—June 30’ 
Revolution” for its popular participation, the role of “youth who aspire to a 
brighter future,” its patriotism, how the population that “transcended class and 
ideology,” and, of course, the role of the “people’s army [that] protected popular 
will.” 48The Sisi regime is engaging in a conflicting balancing act as it fastens 
itself both to Nasser’s regime and the revolution of 2011.  In short, the ambiguity 
of Egypt’s present and future may be enough not to call the revolution a success 
                                                          
47 “Egypt’s Constitution of 2014,” Preamble, 10-12, Constitute Project.   
48 “Egypt’s Constitution of 2014,” Preamble, 11 
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yet, but it is not enough to discount it as a failure. It remains unclear whether or 
not the revolution is finished. 
1.3 - ECONOMIC MOTIVES BEHIND THE 2011 EGYPTIAN 
REVOLUTION 
 
          The 2011 Egypt revolution attracted significant expert analysis, especially 
concerning the motives of the revolution. Some analysts have argued that 
religious, dictatorship and ethnic tensions, and the prevalence of gross corruption 
in government, were some of the main triggers of the Egyptian revolution. 
However, a close analysis of the 2011 revolution in Egypt shows that these factors 
are not sufficient catalysts for a revolution unless they caused an unbearable 
deprivation or poverty and economic inequality. 
1.3.1- WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION 
          In fact, the blatant corruption within the government was one of the main 
factors that caused the 2011 revolution. Ann Lesch revealed that the corruption 
reached the highest scale in Egypt in the mid-2000s following the appointments of 
new cabinet ministers who used their positions to promote corruption.49  
          According to Lesch, the newly appointed ministers used their influence to 
acquire and sell a large portion of the public sector for their personal gains, they 
also discouraged public investment. For instance, the most important ministers 
had a connection with the key economic sets such as Ahmed al- Maghraby, 
minister of housing, were a big player in the hotel realm and Mohamed Mansour, 
minister of transport, was one of the biggest businessman.50 
 
                                                          
49 Lesch, Ann M. "Egypts Spring: Causes of the Revolution." Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 35-48. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00496.x.1‒8. 
50 Ibid., 39. 
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1.3.2- LACK OF DEMOCRACY 
           Lack of democracy is also cited as a catalyst for the 2011 revolution in 
Egypt. Actually, many years of dictatorship of President Mubarak catalyzed the 
2011 revolt. President Mubarak established a bureaucratic government in which 
all powers were centralized in the executive branch. Mubarak also created a 
presidential system in which the president was appointed by the People’s 
Assembly, though the appointment had to be ratified by public referendum. This 




            The reasons behind the remarkable street fights that compelled the 
Egyptian ruler Hosni Mubarak to step out of office was something that exists in 
many countries — food shortages or poverty. Worsening economic situations fed 
the 2011 revolution and remained a significant component in the political uprising. 
The failure of the Egyptian government to sustain a continuous flow of food 
supplies should be viewed as the main factor igniting the revolution.52 
          The Egyptian poor were fighting in front of bakeries to acquire subsidized 
flatbread. Fuel shortages, power cuts, and soaring food prices put pressure on the 
population.53 
           Did the rise in food prices and the increase in Egyptian poverty related to it 
have a damaging effect on Egypt’s social and political stability? Absolutely; 
however, both in 2008 and in 2011 Egypt was among one of the wealthiest 
countries. The rapid rise in food prices, which made Egypt highly dependent on 
                                                          
51 Lesch, 1‒8. 
52 Robert Looney, “Economics of the Arab Spring,” Presentation, FOA Conference on the Arab Spring, 




food imports, resulted in a rapid increase in the number of Egyptians living below 
the poverty line. More than three million Egyptians fell below the poverty line 
during a short period in both uprisings as well.54 
 
1.3.4- UNEQUAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
           Inequality is related to poverty because one of the main results of 
inequality is poverty in a community. How does inequality within a country cause 
conflict? A renowned theory is Ted Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory. Gurr 
argues that a large gap between the expected and actual economic and living 
conditions of a group can fuel conflict.55 Income inequality decreases the buying 
power of middle and low- income people, reducing aggregate demand; however, 
people deriving benefit from inequality seek high yielding investments, leading to 
the rise in the mass of assets.56 
1.3.5- UNEMPLOYMENT 
          Unemployment not only means an absence of income, but also the absence 
of dignity, self-respect, and social standing. Disappointment, boredom, and 
hopelessness are common problems among jobless people. Widespread 
unemployment among young people in parallel with widespread disillusionment 
due to economic conditions paved the way for a revolt.57 
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        Although there are many other reasons for the revolution in Egypt, it can be 
said that the high level of youth unemployment is one of the most important 
motives for the crisis. It’s noteworthy that youth unemployment in Egypt was 
running at more than 30 percent whereas the general unemployment rate was 9.7 
percent in 2010 according to the CIA World Factbook.58  
         Millions of young people throughout the country were too angry for a long 
time about the lack of jobs. As such, the feeling of desperateness resulting from 
inadequate work prospects came to a breakpoint. With a corrupt government that 
ignored investing in the younger generation, possibilities for the future seemed 
very sad. Consequently, a large part of the unemployed youth felt the necessity of 
working informal underpaid jobs, creating employment for them, or waiting for 
the recession to end and for their elders to retire.59 Young people, as a result, 
became increasingly frustrated and upset. 
1.3.6- DEPRIVATION AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
          The Mubarak rule underestimated the anger of its crowds and young people 
due to economic growth.60 As explained in the previous part, The youth did not 
have anything to lose, not a social position in society or a good job, and did not 
have much hope of achieving those in the near future because of growing 
population rate and decreasing job availabilities. They also did not care about the 
thoughts of the people around them if their movements stimulated revolt or 
contempt. As they felt that there was nothing to distinguish them from other 
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young men walking in the streets, they felt unimportant and despised themselves. 
They were not afraid of the police because they did not have much to risk, and the 
policemen themselves did not seem much different from these young men.61 
1.3.7- Gamal Mubarak and the Military 
 
         Although it’s not one of the economic motivations for the revolution we 
can determine it as one of the major political catalysts.  Mubarak, after building 
up a vast network of business enterprises for the military, found himself in the 
crosshairs of the military. The rise of the business elite led by his son Gamal, not 
only threatened the military’s economic empire but caused large portions of 
Egyptians to live in poverty. Mubarak failed to introduce democratic reforms. 
Instead, he focused on preserving the political monopoly of the NDP hoping to 
pave the path for Gamal to attain the presidency. When the 2011 revolution began, 
and Mubarak found himself without the brutal police state he had empowered, it 
became apparent that the military would not sacrifice their dwindling influence in 
politics by saving Mubarak. Instead, they let him fall, hoping that by leading the 
transition never again would they be at the whim of the president.62 
         Julie Taylor and Jeff Martini argue the military decided to intervene in the 
uprising because “The military generals realized that their influence slithering 
away as Mubarak ignored their advice on ministerial appointments, unnoticed 
their economic interests, and prepared a campaign to transfer power to his son 
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against their wishes”.63 However, they prematurely conclude that the actions of 
the military were not meant to “overthrow Mubarak”, rather, the intervention was 
only intended to reposition the power dynamics away from crony capitalism and 
the National Democratic Party NDP. 
1.4 - The role of the Egyptian Armed Forces in Egypt’s Economy 
        The involvement of the Army in the Egyptian economy is nothing new. 
Actually, it’s beganing Under President Gamal Adel Nasser when the army 
officers managed most of the businesses and factories in socialist Egypt. The 
economic ambitions of the army became fully apparent during the presidency of 
Anwar Sadat (1970-1981). The crisis in Egypt after the war of 1973 was the spur 
for military intervention in non-military production.64 
        The military authoritarianism has been ruled Egypt since 1952. The short 
period of democracy trial finished with the 30 June revolution (military coup) in 
2013, which proved the military dominance over the politics65 
      Egypt as a MENA country and post-colonial state was established in a 
particular context which shapes civil-military relations in Egypt. In addition to the 
key geographical, historical and cultural key role of the military in politics, 
Nasserism deeply affects the politics of Egypt in internal and external level, 
especially in the (armed) bureaucracy. Another key component of civil-military 
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relations in Egypt and many Arab countries is the compatibility of regimes with 
Islamism and the compatibility of Islamists with the regime.66 
         Seven years after the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s politics is once again 
dominated by the military. The Arab Spring gave hope that tech-savvy youths 
could alter the power dynamics of authoritarian governments in the region. In 
Egypt, youth-driven mass protests shook the foundation of the 30-year rule of 
Mubarak. They sacrificed their lives and limbs in pursuit of pro-democratic 
change. Their use of peaceful mass demonstrations certainly deserves 
recognition.67 
          General Sisi’s election to the Presidency with 97 percent of the vote in 
2014 where the opposition was non-existent amid crackdowns and arrests gave 
the military an unchecked seat to rule Egypt once again. The speed and intensity 
with which the EAF has reconstituted its economic and political empire in the 
post-Mubarak era are staggering. In addition to restarting defunct industrial 
operations and securing control over massive infrastructure projects, military 
generals are now nearly ubiquitous in the halls of government.  
         Around Seventeen of Egypt’s twenty-seven provincial governors are 
military generals (nineteen if two police officers of equivalent rank are included) 
and the remaining civilian governors share rule with twenty-four major generals 
serving as secretaries-general, assistant secretaries-general, and deputy 
governors.68 
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        President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s emphasized that the share of military-
owned enterprises does not exceed two percent of the Egyptian GDP today, but 
the figure seems too low if one considers the military’s many privileges. Precise 
figures, however, are hard to come by. The military is a “black box”, with little 
information given about its hierarchy, budget, and impacts on public life. 
According to “Law 313”, any news about the armed forces can only be published 
after authorization granted by the director of the military intelligence.69 
        The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) is often referred to as a “black box”—
especially with regard to the institution’s role in the domestic economy. Many of 
the EAF’s sources of influence are obscured  
          Some Egyptian businessmen and foreign investors say they are unsettled 
by the military’s push into civilian activities and complain about tax and other 
advantages granted to military-owned firms. In Sept. 2017 The International 
Monetary Fund warned that private sector development and job creation might be 
hindered by the involvement of entities under the Ministry of Defense. 
         The three main bodies of Military commercial ventures - the Ministry of 
Military Production, which oversees 20 businesses, the Ministry of Defense, and 
the Arab Organization for Industrialization.71 
           The National Security Agency (NSA) is one of the economic agencies 
created and managed by the army, its presence can be seen everywhere. In 1979 
the NSA established with 52 companies active in the sectors of construction, food 
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products, agriculture, and petrol stations.  It manages a network of large clubs, the 
first local fishery in the country and media outlets. Also, (NSA) manufactures 
construction materials, manages most of the country's motorways, imports 
medicines, and wheat. 
           In 2014, the authority began the national transport of meat, poultry and 
other food products produced by the army. It organized a huge programme of 
sales fairs to market its products, sold more cheaply than those of its private 
sector rivals, thanks to the state facilities it could draw on free of charge.72 
        Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) operates a whole 30 factories 
across the country. Civilian products produced in these factories include; 
domestic appliances, fire extinguishers, medical and diagnostic equipment, drills, 
television receivers, computers, batteries, electric and water meters, cars, single-
engine aircraft, and a variety of foods. As the liberalization process intensified in 
Egypt, so did the competition between private companies and the military. A 
predicament they were not happy to be in. One former Minister of MOMP general 
Sayed Meshal who ran the industry stated that revenue in 1999 accounted for 
nearly 2 billion Egyptian pounds a year ($345 million) arising from the selling 
back of products to civilians.73 
          The National Organization for Military Production (NOMP) is the third 
army authority involved in the civil production. Comprising 18 military and civil 
factories, it plays an important economic role in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's Egypt. In 
July 2016, the Health Ministry also agreed on a partnership with NOMP for the 
purchasing of imported medicines. The organization now imports materials and 
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products for hospitals and universities across the country, from syringes and 
solutions to electrocardiograph equipment. 
          But behind the economic empire is another army: that of the conscripted 
soldiers who do the actual work for all of these businesses and projects, including 
the megaprojects so dear to the president. These soldiers are becoming the 
mainstay of economic activity for the army and the regime.74 
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II- Egypt’s Economy 
2.1 The Economic situation 
In 2014, the Government started implementing a bold and 
transformational reforms program, aimed at spurring the economy, enhancing the 
country’s business environment and staging a balanced and inclusive growth.  
The first wave of reforms package focused on rebalancing the macroeconomic 
aspects, which included difficult policy choices that were adopted simultaneously; 
such as the VAT Law, reducing energy subsidies, containing the high growth of 
the wage bill and the liberation of the Egyptian Pound.  
The second phase of reforms targeted investment climate and improving 
governance, which includes the Civil Service Reform Law that was passed in 
October 2016, in addition to a set of undergoing reforms targeting to remove 
investment barriers and attract local and foreign investments. The Government of 
Egypt’s reform program is widely endorsed by key Development Partners, 
including through the World Bank’s programmatic Development Policy 
Financing (DPF) series, the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the African 
Development Bank parallel financing.75 
  
Before the revolution, Egypt enjoyed solid rates of economic growth, in 
the range of 6-7 percent between 2003 and 2009, real GDP grew by 4.7 percent in 
2009 and by 5.3 percent in 2010 (World Bank Data).76 
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In 2016/17, real GDP grew an estimated 4.1%, slightly underperforming the 4.3% 
in 2015/16. Growth is driven mainly by investment and private and public 
consumption, as well as by net exports, which contributed positively for the first 




        In line with the new World Economic Outlook report, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) expects first, Egypt’s economic growth to reach 5.5 % in 
2019 and 6 % by 2023 as a result of the impact of recent economic reforms. 
Second, a decline in unemployment rate to 11.1% in 2018 compared to 12.2 
percent in 201778 
Investment and resilient private consumption expected to improve the 
economic growth, additionally to a gradual increase in exports (particularly from 
gas and tourism). In FY18 the budget deficit is expected to decline to 9.8% of 
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GDP. The fiscal consolidation program is predicted to depend upon revenue 
mobilization, particularly, energy subsidy reforms also the rise in VAT receipts.  
        Furthermore, extreme poverty in Egypt is practically eradicated. Using the 
national poverty threshold, about a third (27.8%) of the population was below the 
poverty line in 2015. Moreover, the high inflation accumulated over the course of 
FY15-FY17 has lowered the purchasing power of households across the 
distribution, reducing the positive spillovers of economic growth, and taking a toll 
on social and economic conditions.79  
2.2 ODA 
Egypt received a significant amount of external assistance compared to 
other developing countries. The official development assistance to Egypt has 
begun to decline from main donors. The major donors to Egypt are the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Commission 
(EC), European member states (EU), Japan and the World Bank.80 Net ODA 
received per capita (current US$) in Egypt was 26.53 as of 2015. Its highest value 
over the past 55 years was 105.50 in 1990, while its lowest value was 0.29 in 
1969.81 
In point of fact, the January 2011 and June 2013 revolutions changed the 
political and socio-economic situation of Egypt. This new situation created a 
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doubtful and ambiguous environment for international donors and the institutions 
over the last four decades. 
 
 
As we can see from the total ODA table there was an increase in the 
Economic and infrastructure sector and for the social infrastructure service in the 







































2005-2010 23.76% 35.83% 
16.62
% 4.02% 7.95% 10.54% 0.52% 0.76% 
2011-2016 36.35% 39.44% 8.30% 3.22% 4.67% 5.22% 2.06% 0.72% 
2005-2016 29.68% 39.86% 
12.14
% 3.41% 5.56% 7.44% 1.22% 0.68% 
 
                                                          




















          Official development assistance (ODA) to Egypt in 2009 totaled USD 925 
million (OECD 2011a). Since 2005, Egypt has received ODA of, on average, 
USD 1 billion annually, and ODA has averaged less than 1% of gross national 
income and approximately 3% of central government expense (WDI, 2011). The 
top eight donors’ contributed76% of Egypt’s core ODA (OECD, forthcoming) 
         The 2010 target is to halve the proportion of aid flows that are not currently 
reported on government budgets, with at least 85% of aid reflected in the budget. 
In 2010, 24% of Egypt’s aid was reported on budget. Egypt has not managed to 
halve the share of aid not reported on budget and the year 2010 marks a 
significant setback when compared to the previous scores of 58% and 57% in 
2005 and 2007 respectively. Japan and the United Nations were the only major 
donors to record scores of over 50%. Between them, the World Bank and the 
United States provided over USD 1.3 billion in off-budget flows. Many donors 
recorded worse performance compared to 2007. France was the only donor where 
government budget estimates were greater than disbursements, suggesting that the 
major barrier is the flow of information rather from donors to the government 
rather than an issue of disbursement.83 
         There is a current and growing debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid, 
especially in 
Egypt, as the country is going through a critical period in its transition to 
democracy. The obvious question is to what extent foreign aid to Egypt will be 
effective in promoting economic growth. It is recommended that the government 
pay particular attention to direct the incoming foreign aid to Egypt in productive 
                                                          




activities rather than financing imports, and also it is strongly recommended to 
rely on its internal resources, to help the country to promote growth and overcome 
the challenges in the current critical transition period.84 
 
  
                                                          
84 Hoda Abd El Hamid Ali, pp.743-751 
38 
 
III- Egypt’s challenges 
       The Egyptian government faces a lot of challenges to meet the continuing 
demands of Egyptians after the 2011 uprising in Egypt; a lot of protesters 
demands stay unachieved. A mixture of local obstacles, jointly with rockiness in 
the MENA region has hindered Egypt’s ongoing transition.  
 
                 Egypt faces a number of challenges such as political, economic, 
environmental, and social. Subsidy reform has imposed serious costs on the 
poorest in Egyptian society, from underequipped hospitals, deteriorating railroads, 
and highways to overcrowded schools. Egyptian youth are progressively more 
incapable to join the job market as a reflection to an over-extended education 
system with the growing population. Repression on free expression, political 
dissent, and meaningful opposition Under President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi led to a 
lack of economic growth.85 
 
3.1- Social challenges 
3.1.1- Demographics 
  The explosive rate of Egypt’s population growth is one of the main 
challenges. Still the government efforts in curbing population growth have not 
been successful even with family planning policies. According to the UN’s 2017 
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World Population Prospects Report expected that Egypt’s population will jump to 
150 million in 2050, and an astounding 200 million by 2100.86 
The population is concentrated in only 8 % of Egypt’s land mass which is around 
a million square kilometers only along the length of the Nile River and in the Nile 
Delta. 
If we look at the data Egypt’s population density ranked 115 globally (divided by 
the total land mass) but in the same time it ranks 14th globally if divided by 
inhabitable area, that consider Egypt’s cities amongst the highest crowded cities 
in the world.87 
3.1.2- Education: The paradox 
        Since Nasser, the nominally free education has been provided by the 
Egyptian government. In spite of this, the public education quality has 
degenerated over the decades. While the population more than doubled the 
government expenditure for educational programmes was stagnated
  An element of the economic reform programme, Egypt has increasingly 
decreased state subsidies for fuel and food, in order to allocate some of the money 
saved for healthcare and education. This reallocation hasn’t up till now to have a 
significant impact. In line with (CAPMAS) Statistics, from 2004 to 2017, the 
government’s budget allocated for pre-university education reduced from 11.9 % 
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to 7.4 % in this period. Also, the allocation for university education decline from 
3.5 % to 2.3 %.89
Along with other countries in the region Egypt’s allocation for education 
is one of the lowest amounts. Furthermore, the insufficient salaries for Professors 
and teachers impose them to supplement their income through private tutoring, 
pushing them to teach less and underperform.90 
Among children age’s 15-24 Egypt remains one of the highest illiteracy 
rates in the Middle East.91Generally, Egypt’s illiteracy rates around (14.4 % and 
26 %) for males and females respectively.92However, 35 % of Egyptian children 
in school unable to write or read that what Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
progress report in 2015 showed.93On the other hand, Income inequality in Egypt 
has a direct impact on the quality of education for students. Affluent families in 
Egypt send their children to private or international schools as a result of the low 
quality of the education in the public institutions.94   
3.1.3- Health 
         Health sector represents another example of the inequality in Egypt, the 
2014 constitution particularly article 18 mandates healthcare expenditure with a 
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minimum of 3 % of GNP.  But still general public health care system is coming 
under further deterioration. In 2014 Government expenditure on public healthcare 
has been awfully low, amounting only 2.15 % of GNP– which is very low 
compared to the worldwide average of about 6 % and the regional average of 
3.12 %.  
3.2- Economic challenges 
         Egypt still faces a range of economic obstacles. Even after the 
implementation of economic reform, and asceticism measures Egypt partially 
relies on aid, loans from the IMF, fuel shipments from Arab Gulf states, and the 
raised funds flow from international debt markets to support the political stability 
and to stabilize its economy. Sadly, in the long term rent-seeking technique won’t 
improve Egypt’s economy. For short and longer terms Egypt ought to take actions 
that promote comprehensive economic development and stability prospects.97 
3.2.1- Ambitious reforms 
  After the 2014/2015 fiscal year, Sisi government implemented an 
ambitious economic reform plan. The motivation of the reforms was to prove to 
Egypt’s regional and international partners and to the IMF that Egypt had a 
suitable technique in place to recalibrate and development the economy. 
Moreover, the main goal for the plan is to attract foreign direct investment. 
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         Egypt GDP growth has averaged 2 %, As a result of political and economic 
instability since 2011. But still, there are some reasons for optimism, after several 
years of slow growth, three reasons behinds the newfound expectation of 
economic recovery. First, fiscal reforms have supported to control public finances. 
Second, the Egyptian pound flotation restrains the black market for foreign 
currency, and lifted the main restriction on foreign currency liquidity. Third, the 
giant Zohr field together with the booming development of Egypt’s gas reserves, , 
can probably ensure the domestic supply of energy with potential for export 
market in the future as well improve the trade deficit.98 
          The government through the subsidy reforms endeavors to reduce the 
public expenditure. Energy subsidies share 21 % of Egypt’s total budget roughly 
73 % of all subsidies.99Evidently, the energy subsidies considered as a pillar for 
the poor people, however, the government acted in the opposite way with 
providing subsidies to higher incomes households, because they consume extra 
energy per capita.100 As a part of the IMF reforms, the government raises the 
energy prices by up to 50 % in 2014, 101 which is include electricity; gas and 
gasoline prices for both industrial and domestic consumption. Not only Energy 
but also water tariffs have increased by up to 50 %.102  Due to the fact, the 
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purchasing power of poorer Egyptians has significantly decreased because of the 
flotation of the pound, and the subsidy reform. 
3.2.2- Economic inequality  
The wealth inequality gap is tremendous and keeps going as a result of the 
economic favoritism that has benefited aristocracy and Egyptian elites for decades. 
In line with the (IRIS) study, the wealth inequality ranked Egypt as the eighth 
worst in terms of wealth distribution. 103 
3.2.3- Failure of traditional revenue streams 
Tourist is Egyptian economy’s major revenue however since 2011; the 
tourist numbers drove down due to a government crackdown on political 
dissidents and uncertainties of political instability. Moreover, Egypt fails to attract 
foreign investment which has seriously restrained economic process. Also, the 
project of the New Suez Canal didn’t generate enormous increases in revenue as 
the government promised although the billions of dollars invested.104  
        The new administrative capital project with an expected cost of $300 billion, 
105has faced various challenges with a vast debate on whether or not such a new 
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capital is essential, or whether Egypt would be injects this tremendous investment 
to improve the current infrastructure or to allocate in healthcare and education.106 
3.2.4- The economic role of the military 
        The military dominates the Egyptian policy and economy will keep a 
basic draw back that enhances corruption in addition to discrimination. the 
government purported to launch strategy that promotes entrepreneurship in hand 
with increasing (SMEs) projects and encourage everyone to participate in 
developing the economy. However, the Government acting in contradictory as in 
2015, a new law has been issued by president el-Sisi which authorizes the military 
to establish firms with the contribution of foreign capital or domestic.107 The law 
provides special standing and privileges to the military in the primarily economy 
due to its capability to maintain the production cost very low —conscripts with 
not paid used as a worker,108 —that impose obstacles and difficulties for the 
private sector to vie. The economic reforms supposed to attract new foreign 
investment in Egypt; but in fact, they fall to engage with the economy structural, 
that hinder entrepreneurship and the private sector for improvement.109 
3.2.5- Youth unemployment 
           The rapid increase in unemployment rate has participated to a brain-drain 
that has led sharply to increase the number of Egyptians emigrating or legally 
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migrating since 2011. 110  while Egypt’s youth realize themselves gradually 
economically underprivileged, they’re additionally shifting into more and 
more politically disenfranchised. In line with the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), Egypt’s youth (aged 15-24) around 31.3 % stay unemployed;111 the private 
sector has not been capable to create new jobs for the fresh entrants. as well, with 
the cutbacks within the public sector. 
         Additionally, the education system could be a clear education-occupation 
mismatch, with its various bequest problems antecedently printed, The protests by 
Master’s and Ph.D. possessors throughout the last 10 years to get employ within 
the public sector might be a transparent evidence of the education-occupation 
match112 – (I had the honor to be one among them). 
3.3- Security and political challenges 
3.3.1- Resurgent authoritarianism 
            The January 25th revolution increase the ambitions of Egyptians, 
however because of domestic, regional and international situation, the revolution 
demands stay unachieved. Since 2011 Egypt’s political transition has been further 
tumultuous than its economic one. In 2014 President el-Sisi was elected with a 
guarantee of security and economic prosperity. The Economist described el-Sisi’s 
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rule as ‘worse than [under] Mubarak’ with an increase in repressive measures.113 
As well as a lot of youth activists who were at the head of the January 25th 
revolution, many stay imprisoned with a minimum due legal protections or 
process.  
In line with the Amnesty International report in 2015 showed that Egypt’s 2011’s 
‘Generation Protest’ had become 2015’s ‘Generation Jail’.114 In the same year, 
Human Rights Watch reported that since the revolution enormous numbers of 
those imprisoned have died in custody. the majority of those deaths happened 
beneath dubious circumstances and Egyptian jails are ‘bursting at the seams’ due 
to the extensive government quelling and crackdown on political dissent.115 
3.3.2- Restrain freedom of expression 
         A new law in the media regulatory framework issued in 2016 by 
President el-Sisi the new law established three government- control decision-
making bodies with comprehensive powers above licensing and content, with 
very little protection for the press.116  
In a televised speech in 2016, President el-Sisi was harshly sincere 
concerning his opinion about different political views. He clearly confirmed: 
‘Don’t listen to anyone but me’117. Since the 2011revolution, Egypt ranked third 
worldwide for jailing journalists rate according to the Committee to Protect 
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Journalists (CPJ), while the imprisonment of journalists continues to increase in 
Egypt.118 
3.3.3- An Islamic insurgency 
In Sinai, (ABM) Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group the IS-allied has carried out 
various attacks on Egypt’s military and security forces. Extremist groups found 
Sinai a fertile ground to grow and activate, to some extent because the 
government ignore to develop and improve this area particularly in North Sinai 
and its lack of ability to secure the area’s rugged terrain. 119 So far, Egypt’s 
military operation in Sinai has failed to eliminate the terrorism till now although 
the tremendous casualties and the long-term operation. 120 And still, terrorism 
Attacks increasing across the country not exclusively in Sinai, as many terrorist 
attacks that have occurred targeted The Coptic Christian community in Egypt.121 
 
The revolution has economic consequences. Tourism, a major supply of 
foreign currency has been badly affected with a decline in the number of the 
tourists due to fears of terrorist act and instability. Travel warnings 
advising voters have been issued by several countries around the 
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world to rethink trip to Egypt, mainly North Sinai. 122  The number of tourists 
visiting Egypt was sharply fallen from14.7 million in 2010 to 9.3 million in 
2015,123 with drop from 7.7 % in 2010 to 3.2 % in 2016 in GDP contribution.  
3.4- Environment and resource challenges 
3.4.1-  Pressure on water resources 
         Due to a number of factors Egypt’s water supply expected to come under 
ever-greater stress. First, still there is an inefficient use of water for agricultural 
production. Second, the massive increase of population can mean less on the 
water supply per capita. Third, scarce downfall and high temperatures as sound 
effects of temperature change would force hyperbolic agricultural irrigation. 124 
Fourth, an accrued manufacturing of waste and unprocessed industrial 
waste can cause a continuing deterioration in water quality. 125  All of 
those elements can share in bigger prices and a larger burden for Egypt’s 
economy, so that Egypt needs to implement an urgent strategy to upgrades 
infrastructure for water delivery systems and agricultural. 
           Egypt shares around 55.5 billion m3of water from the Nile River that is 
mainly used for agriculture (roughly 85.6 %). However, the Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam can have an effect on the offered water provides flowing into 
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Egypt — the dam currently under construction —. On the accurate impact of the 
dam on Egypt’s water supplies, still there are no certain researches but some 
evaluations expected that water supply possibly will turn down by 
25 %.126.Obviously, the dam will affect Egypt’s overall agricultural production, 
food security and will an impression on electricity production from the Aswan 
High Dam. 127 On the consequences of the dam, there is a potential for conflict 
between Egypt and Ethiopia within the next 10 years.128 
3.4.2- Increased energy needs 
The demand for energy in Egypt is continue to increase especially with grows 
of the population along with it is scarce sources; Growing population in hand with 
energy shortage from time to time leads to blackouts, particularly in the summer 
months.129 Egypt is extremely obsessed with petrochemicals combines with 88 % 
coming from gas and oil . So, the establishment of sustainable and renewable 
power sources such as hydro, wind and solar is the only solution. 
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At the end of 2017, the giant Zohr gas field started the production, Egypt 
through Zohr gas field aiming to enhance and stabilize the domestic energy 
market and by 2020 become a net exporter.131On the other hand, Egypt is looking 
for establishing nuclear energy capability which was a national dream since 
President Nasser, Russia will make it true and will build nuclear reactor. 
3.4.3- Climate change 
 
         CAPMAS projections explain that the productivity of key agricultural 
crops in Egypt can face a decline in over the following 10 years.132Moreover, 
Egypt will suffer from the impact of climate change in the next decades. The Nile 
Delta only about 1 meter above current sea levels which made it the most 
critically vulnerable area due to the sea levels rising. The northern part of the 
delta is already sinking at average of concerning 4 to 8 millimeter annually, the 
lands being at the moment scoured by the Mediterranean coastal because 
of compaction of strata underlying the plain, unstable motion and therefore the 
shortage of enough new sediment to re-nourish.133 
3.4.4- Pollution 
In line with the WHO report, the greater Cairo experiences a number 
of the worst pollutions in the global. Also, the report emphasized that air 
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pollution in the MENA region and Egypt overtakes the international average.135 
Egypt’s air quality has worsened since 1992, as the World Bank 
remarks. Additionally, the pollution in the River Nile has sharply increased with 
critical health problems for Egyptian.  However, high pollution 
levels can create a negative impact on economic development and the general 
public health system. 
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I. The significance of the BRI 
 
1.1-  The initiative announcement 
The BRI is an ambitious proposal from China, aiming at shaping a 
platform for heterogeneous and win-win cooperation plus mutual development. 
In March 2015, China unveiled the Vision and Action Plan on the ‘Belt and Road’ 
Initiative (translated as ‘One Belt and One Road’ Initiative) to the world.138 This 
Initiative is constituted by the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (hereinafter ‘SREB’ 
and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ (hereinafter ‘CMSR’). The SREB is 
supposed to start from Central Asia and Southern Asia, run through Western Asia 
and go all the way to Europe. The CMSR is designed to go in one route from 
China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and 
from the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. The BRI is grand, 
taking about 63% of the global population, 29% of the world’s economic output 
and 23.9% of the global export of goods and services. 
in February 2015 during the leadership of Zhang Gaoli, The Leading 
cluster for Promoting the BRI was established and its office has been placed 
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under the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top 
macroeconomic management agency139.in addition to the National Development 
and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore the 
Ministry of Commerce are another two main ministries involved in the 
implementation of the BRI. Both the security apparatus and the military not 
involved in an important role in the BRI implementation.  
 
1.2-  The logic of the initiative 
The BRI has become the focal point of China’s national strategy. However, 
the objective of BRI is a subject highly debated by academia, think tanks, and 
public media while it’s begun. Several scholars are explaining the BRI as China’s 
new grand strategy with military aspirations and security aspects. This highlight 
on the geopolitical motivation and impacts of the BRI tends to come 
simultaneously with a zero-sum assessment of China’s rise. 140 The Marshall Plan 
has typically been compared to the BRI and interpreted as a threat to U.S and 
Western hegemony.141 
In order to understand the BRI logic, one necessary be aware of both 
domestic and global economy in which the initiative is embedded. Modern 
international relations studies stress those theories of world politics supposed to 
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think about the interaction between international and domestic dynamics.142As 
BRI policies can be interpreted as a result of games played between restriction 
from domestic institutions and society facing policy-makers in the domestic arena, 
additionally international constraints facing the international arena. 
Due to its escalating weight in the global economy, Currently China 
doesn’t have a purely domestic economic policy. In 2007, after decades of 
exceptionally sturdy economic growth China has become the world’s second-
largest economy. It conjointly became the world’s second-largest importer and 
largest exporter. In 2015 investment in China was fourfold the level in Japan and 
exceeds investment in the U.S and the EU by 35 and 25%, respectively. Due to 
the vital role of the Chinese economy, it's not shocking that some massive 
domestic economic project in China might cause influence all over the worldwide 
economy in direct or indirect.143 
However, there has been a main shift in mentality in Chinese leaders’ 
strategic thinking from a “small-country” to a “big country” particularly after the 
leadership change in 2012. Through this adjustment of mentality, Chinese policy-
makers started to focus similarly on domestic and international markets by 
arranging domestic reforms in light-weight of worldviews. China’s new 
leadership has realized that China has to harmonize with its major partners 
regarding the international consequences of China’s rise. .144 
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The ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative has become the focal point of China’s 
national strategy. 145  Domestically, it helps China to cope with the sluggish 
economic ‘New Normal’ 146  by integrating China’s inland, northwestern and 
north-eastern regions into the forefronts of opening up and exporting China’s 
overproduction capacity to countries over the BRI. More important, 
internationally, it is China’s reply to the U.S pivoting to Asia147 and promoting 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (hereinafter ‘TPP’) 148  and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter ‘TTIP’). 149  China 
does not want to be marginalized in the world trade and investment system, 
therefore the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative reaches out to the countries in the Central, 
Southern and Western Asia that are not included by the TPP or TTIP.150 This 
Initiative may trigger the redistribution of powers in the world trade and 
investment system in the long run.151 
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          The BRI aims to integrate the development strategies of the 
participated countries to generate synergies and scale back the institutional 
barriers that prohibit investment and trade exchanges.152 
1.3-  What are BRI’s strategic priorities? 
 
➢ Support China’s “Go Global” policy  
➢ Increase exports to BRI countries  
➢ Promote industrial restructuring  
➢ Strengthen China’s geopolitical role  
➢ Strengthen the RMB’s global role  
➢ Reduce industrial oversupply.153 
 
 
1.4-  “Vision and Actions”  
 
The BRI is expected to encourage engagement and collaboration in 
five areas: 
 
• policy coordination between countries participating in the BRI, particularly in 
respect of economic development strategies and policies. 
• capacity building through improvement of connectivity and harmonization of 
standards in transport, construction of port infrastructure, strengthening 
cooperation in science and technology, increase of platforms for cooperation and 
improvement of infrastructure in energy and civil aviation, and structure of cross-
border communications networks; 
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• liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment to lower trade barriers, 
improve transparency in technical trade measures and expand mutually beneficial 
investment, as well as to strengthen cooperation in emerging industries and 
industrial parks.  
• financial cooperation building currency stability, finance frameworks and 
investment, credit data systems in Asia, encouraging industrial equity investment 
and private funds. 
• People-to-people exchange, advancing cooperation in areas like student 
exchange, youth employment programmes, and training in entrepreneurship. 
 
1.5-  China’s objectives for the BRI 
• Enhancing Chinese exports of equipment and products, as well as its 
engineering and construction capabilities and technologies; 
• Dominant logistics chains to support Chinese trade with Europe; 
• Support economic convergence and more balanced development across 
            China; 
• Establishing a mechanism to escalate the use of the Renminbi (RMB), as a 
method of international payment; 
• Creating additional overland energy routes to supply oil and gas from 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Pakistan;154 
 
Who are the key players to-date?  
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     Chinese government statements point out that Fifty Chinese SOEs have 
invested or participated in almost 1,700 projects in the participated countries 
region over the past three years. Major players include: China Communications 
Construction, China State Construction Engineering, Power China, Sinomach 
China Railway Construction Corporation, China Railway Group, CNPC, and 
State Grid 
Who are the major financiers? 
There are two major financiers. First, (Financiers of Chinese companies) 
Chinese policy banks: China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of 
China, and Silk Road Fund: Established in 2014 with USD 40 billion of initial 
total capital. Second, (Financiers of projects in BRI countries) Asian 
Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB):  Established in 2015 with USD 100 
billion of initial total capital. And New Development Bank:  Established in 2014 
by the BRIC countries. 
China will not fully fund BRI. By 2030, we expect that over half of BRI-
related projects will be funded by multilateral banks, private capital, and foreign 
governments.155 
1.6- Countries participating in the BRI 
Countries 







Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam 
 
                                                          







Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Central Asia  
 





Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 





Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, 




II - The BRI and China’s Foreign policy 
 
2.1- The BRI as China’s Major Foreign Policy 
 
We have to take into consideration that around three-fourths of the world’s 
population involved in BRI with 40% of world GDP.157 The implementation of 
BRI can more strengthen economic integration between Asia and Europe. 
However, the current international geopolitical atmosphere, particularly in U.S. 
and EU, has raised serious challenges to globalization. With President Trump 
actions such as withdrawal from (TPP), protectionist trade policies, immigration 
restrictions, China U.S. trade war, and his threatened to pull back from the UN 
and NATO. All this factors have ignited concrete doubts on the American 
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hegemony at the long run. We are witnessing a historical turning purpose with a 
tremendous risk that globalization goes into reverse.158 
 
         In fact, China has defended globalization and boost new multilateralism at a 
series of global summits.159Yet, China continues to be a developing country with 
a solely common fraction of the US’s GDP per capita. China hasn’t power or duty 
to lead and defend globalization alone. The role of Europe as a partner is very 
important. The BRI is an open proposal from China to Europe to forge a platform 
for mutual cooperation. The historical responsibility of Europe is to form 
multilateralism prevail once more. Consequently, China and Europe ought 
to build advanced property, and multiple cooperation for mutual advantages. 
People-to-people bond is a determinant social factor in gathering the 
public support required for the implementation of the initiative. As the action plan 
states, “friendly cooperation” consists in promoting cultural exchange among 
students, and expanding the scale of tourism by simplifying visa application 
procedures along the BRI countries. Moreover, it aims to strengthen the 
cooperation of science and technology and encourage research and forums 
through the creation of think tanks.160 
Zhong Sheng highlighted that BRI doesn’t aim to create a mechanism that 
is “closed, rigid, or anti-foreign” and doesn’t aspire to dominate regional affairs 
establishing a sphere of influence. Actually, he underline that “the BRI is not a 
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Chinese matter, but a joint undertaking of all the countries concerned. It is not 
China’s private interests’ belt, but it where the nations share interests”161 
Li Ziguo emphasize on the importance of the BRI in nurturing the 
development of less developed western provinces in China, by involving them to 
the wealthy eastern provinces. As he argues, the BRI initiative “will turn the 
western interior into the frontier in opening up to the world, development 
opportunities in the central and western regions will increase, and new growth 
points will emerge”.162 Foreign Minister Wang Yi163 holds that China seeks equal- 
footed consultation and grants no interference in the decision-making of other 
countries. He further maintains that the initiative “is based on transparency and 
openness”, and it complements the existing regional cooperation mechanism. 
 
2.2- BRI Internal and External Challenges  
The BRI is a very ambitious project with a huge potential in terms of 
economic growth and political stability. This enormous project additionally 
includes internal and external challenges that would backfire, aggravating “blind 
development” and political destabilization164 
The first challenge is that BRI initiative could change China’s major 
trends policy, shifting the interest on westward continental overture at the expense 
of coastal China, taking into consideration a strong interdependence between 
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coastal China and the global economy. This risk consists of the unpredictability of 
promoting westward policies.  
The second challenge is the lack of coordination under the BRI initiative. 
The Chinese local and provincial governments participated in BRI economic 
opportunities start pouring substantial subsidies into new initiatives without 
coordinating themselves. The rush to implement these projects could seriously 
lead to “duplication and wastage”. 
The third challenge lies in the risk of dealing with private funding firms 
that face financial distress under BRI initiatives. For example, private funding 
companies such as the “Maritime Silk Road Investment Fund Management 
Centre” 165  could constitute a risk as “private companies could require public 
support if [they] should find itself in financial distress”.166 
The fourth challenge for the foreign policy the risk lies in opposition 
parties in China’s neighboring countries could use the BRI initiative as mean to 
stir up protests, pointing at China’s interferences in their domestic affairs. For the 
economic field, consists of in the provision of huge amount of financial resources 
to low-return projects and high-risk countries, causing excessive reliance on 
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2.3- BRI Security Implications  
 
Li Xiangyang 168  emphasized on the importance of establishing a 
community of destiny to secure BRI cooperation in non-economic fields.  Li 
Xiangyang stresses on the essential of realizing the following “four links.” The 
first link consists of ensuring the security transport routes with a special focus on 
the Maritime Silk Road; protective sea-lane security implies non-traditional 
security cooperation like “jointly combating piracy, joint sea rescue work, and 
multinational joint law enforcement”. The second link regards the strengthening 
of antiterrorism cooperation at a regional level, “terrorism is the tumor in the 
political stability and economic development of many countries along the BRI 
route, and is also the major hindrance to regional cooperation.” The third link 
emphasizes the need for establishing a settlement mechanism designed to resolve 
territorial disputes in the region. The fourth link advocates the significance of 
creating a mechanism for joint exploitation of marine resources in light of 
unsettled territorial and sea disputes.169 
U.S considers BRI overseas bases as a means to improve China’s sphere 
of influence and brings smaller countries under China’s sphere of influence. This 
point of view lies in Booz Allen Hamilton’s String of Pearl’s theory, arguing that 
China could turn its maritime infrastructure into military bases. The strategic 
position of these bases could expand China’s sphere of influence and encircle 
India, securing safe passages through the Strait of Malacca.170As the Chinese 
perspective points out, China knows that establishing good relations with its 
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neighboring countries along the sea routes is of key strategic importance for the 
creation of the BRI initiative171 
 
2.3.1 Is the BRI a Chinese Version of the Marshall Plan? 
 
U.S. perspective and many observers activates a comparison between the 
U.S. funded Marshal Plan and the BRI.172 
There are evident differences between the BRI initiative and the Marshal 
plan in terms of background, content, and aim. Starting from the background, the 
Marshal Plan unleashed the ideological confrontation between the U.S and the 
Soviet Union, preventing communist parties in Western Europe from getting into 
power during the postwar period. Differently, the BRI does not entail this 
ideological aspect, originating from a global need to promote growth and 
establishing peace and security.173 
The Marshal Plan was mainly a recovery program aimed toward providing 
West European economies with financial support. Differently, the BRI aims to 
share the production capacity of high quality among the parties involved in the 
project. While the Marshal plan was as a “one-way export”, the BRI consists in 
“jointly discussing investment projects, building infrastructure, and sharing the 
achievements of cooperation”.174 
Focusing on the designed goals of both initiatives, the Marshal Plan 
mainly worked as a strategic tool to keep the European market under its influence. 
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The Marshal plan was based on strict political conditions that excluded all those 
countries in favor of the Soviet Union. By comparison, the BRI undertaking does 
not carry any strategic intent and does not place any political condition on 
countries taking part in the initiative.  
China’s BRI clearly differs from U.S. Marshal Plan in several ways. First, 
the BRI is open and inclusive, welcoming all countries to take part in the project. 
In line with this, the initiative does not possess any ideological background and 
does not impose any political restrictions. Second, China does not seek hegemony 
in the international system (as the U.S. did through the creation of the Bretton 
Woods system), calling for “multipolarization and equal consultations on all 
international matters”.175 Last, the BRI 176 is designed to be a long-term initiative 
rather than a contingent fiscal plan such as the Marshall Plan.177 
But maybe the situation is different in the Middle East, If Beijing’s BRI 
strategy comes to fruition, it will be a catalyst for shifting power alliances and the 
changing fortunes of nation states. First, China desires to play an additional 
important role in security issues within the Middle East, to point out its 
responsibilities and capabilities as a rising power. Second, China conjointly hopes 
to obtain economic and cultural profits from its interactions with the Middle 
East.178 
                                                          
175 Wang Shang, "Commentary: Chinese Marshall Plan Analogy Reveals Ignorance, Ulterior Intentions." 
Commentary: Chinese Marshall Plan Analogy Reveals Ignorance, Ulterior Intentions - Xinhua | 
English.news.cn. March 11, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
03/11/c_134057346.htm. 
176 The Marshal plan endured four fiscal years and allocated $ 13 billion in different forms among West 
European countries through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
177 The Marshal plan (European Recovery Program, ERP) lasted four years from 1948-1952 
178 Xue Li and Zheng Yuwen, "The Future of China's Diplomacy in the Middle East." The Diplomat. July 29, 




       Some see China’s growing role in MENA region as signs of an opportunistic 
long game to fill the “vacuum” left there by the United States under the Obama 
and Trump administrations However, these actions are more accurately 
understood as incremental steps that represent a deepening investment in a 
strategic region—not necessarily a Chinese plan for an activist engagement in the 
Middle East.179 
2.4- BRI and IR theories 
        As China continues to push investments and enhancing its economic ties in 
the region, Asian countries and the main powers in the international community 
began to enquire concerning China’s motivations behind the BRI. These 
motivations may be analyzed through IR theories: liberalism and realism. On one 
hand, the liberal analysis holds that China is attending to establish a positive total 
game in which all countries will reciprocally profit through stronger infrastructure 
connectivity, increased trade, and new financial institutions. On the other hand, 
realist argues that China’ BRI may be a veiled try to establish regional dominance, 
create opportunities to convert harbors into overseas bases along the Indian Ocean, 
and challenge the international order.180 
2.4.1- The BRI through a Realist lens 
         The realist believes that there are important pieces of evidence that support 
the inspection of China orchestrating a grand strategy. In line with the realist 
analysis, the BRI and its infrastructure developments improve solely China’s 
national interest. Second, the BRI project permits China to bring south Asian 
countries underneath its sphere of influence, establishing regional hegemony. 
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Third, the BRI through its new institutions- the AIIB and SRF- seek to challenge 
the Bretton Woods international system. Ranging from the first assumption, 
realists underline that BRI superior investment in South Asia mirror China’s 
increasing necessitates for natural resources.  
        China’s demand for imported oil, natural gas, and coal is expected to rise by 
60% by 2010 and 2035.181 So that, China is functioning on securing supply lines 
connecting China to the Middle East and Africa Specifically, China is attempting 
through extra-economic corridors to beat the Strait of Malacca since whoever 
controls that strait be able to exercise a stronghold on China’s supply energy lines. 
Through a realist lens, China’s vision of diversifying supply lines aims to advance 
solely Chinese national interest instead of promoting domestic growth in its 
neighboring countries. 
     Nevertheless, China’s strategic actions in securing supply lines 
don't totally support the realist position unless there are clear pieces of evidence 
that Chinese-led infrastructures exploit countries’ economies collaborating within 
the BRI project182 
According to this view, China is attempting through its infrastructures 
developments to expand its sphere of influence in South Asia, dictating economic 
and political policies. In keeping with this read, the BRI and its economic 
corridors act as a strategy to form South Asian countries economically and 
politically dependent from China183 
Additionally, India is worried that China’s initiatives could interfere in its 
sphere of influences. Indeed, China has succeeded in surpassing India in trade 
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relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma, enjoying good economic 
relations with nearly all countries Furthermore, realists argue that China is 
supporting countries that could challenge India’s economically. According to this 
assumption, Beijing’s robust relationship with Pakistan enables it to restrain 
India’s influence in the region. 184  Moving to the worldwide level, China’s 
recently conceived financial institutions, the AIIB and the SRF, represent through 
a realist lens a challenge to the established order of the international 
system. Additionally, the incapability of providing adequate funds in the region 
by Japan and U.S. led ADB, pressed China to arise with a multilateral solution.185 
 
2.4.2- The BRI through a Liberal lens 
 
       China has declared to seek economic growth and modernization through 
peaceful developments since its opening policy in 1978. The launch of the BRI 
initiative in the region reaffirms this strategic choice, seeking to create a 
multilateral infrastructure framework that promotes economic integration, mutual 
cooperation, and a win-win environment.  
         The first assumption lies in China’s need to rebalance its economy by 
creating stronger economic ties between the wealthy eastern provinces and the 
less developed western ones as well as with its neighboring countries. The BRI 
would correct these economic disparities by connecting China to its neighboring 
countries through the western provinces. Although the realist considers the BRI as 
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an attempt to precede only China’s national interest, past and recent evidence 
show a different view of China’s intentions.  
        China has always adopted a noninterference/ mutual respect policy towards 
its neighboring countries, recognizing the importance of refraining itself from 
interfering in domestic affairs of other countries. Besides, China has dynamically 
supported its neighboring countries by providing economic assistance in terms of 
infrastructure developments.  
        In particular, China has invested significant resources in the constructions of 
ports in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, providing both countries with fundamental 
infrastructures designed to strengthen regional integration and promote mutual 
growth. As the data show, a significant rise in trade occurred between China and 
its neighboring countries, accounting for $45 billion in trade.186 
        The second liberal view sees the BRI as a tool to increase economic 
integration through the infrastructure developments. The BRI initiative has the 
potentials to establish new economic corridors and give the possibility of 
including China into South Asian organizations such as the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
The involvement of China in multilateral organizations 
may facilitate overcome geopolitical frictions between India and China; gap the 
trail to new economic corridors under the BRI project. Although these positive 
trends, India continues to be avoided obtaining concerned during this project, 
stall any initiative that might more expand China’s influence within the region. 
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On its behalf, China must realize a typical ground with India, demonstrating that 
the BRI doesn't clash against India’s own Act Easy policy.187 
Moving to the third assumption, the liberal perspective maintains that the 
BRI with its newly conceived financial institutions, the AIIB and SRF, seek to 
beneficially complement the international system by encouraging reforms. The 
financial engines of the BRI require evidences that support the liberal agenda.  
First, the AIIB doesn't confront the international system but rather it 
modernizes it, by introducing new efficient institutions into the international order. 
The AIIB presented itself as solution to the lack of developing countries’ 
international recognition, allowing emerging countries to actively take part in this 
institution and providing fair economic conditions to loans. 
          Second, China has strained itself to a vote supported equal share among the 
founding members that almost represents all the South Asian countries, by 
creating a multilateral system. 
          Last, the AIIB is open to any country interested in taking part in the project, 
discrediting the idea that China and the United States will fall into the Thucydides 
trap.188 
The Chinese perspective based on liberal assumptions demonstrates that 
China increased military presence in the region is limited to provide a safe 
endeavor for the Chinese-led construction maritime facilities. As a spokesperson 
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for the PRC Defense Ministry openly stated, China “has not built any military 





III The BRI Dimension 
 
3.1 The Dimension of the OBOR initiative 
 





1- China-Indochina Peninsular Economic Corridor (CIPEC)  ACTIVE 
 
This corridor is from the Pearl River Delta and goes west along the 
Nanchong-Guang’an Expressway and Nanning-Guangzhou high-speed railway 
via Nanning and Pingxiang to Hanoi and Singapore. It connected China with the 
                                                          




Indochina peninsula and goes through Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, 
Myanmar, and Malaysia.190 
The nine highways connecting the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
interconnect with the ‘North-South Economic Corridor’, ‘East-West Economic 
Corridor’ and ‘Southern Economic Corridor’, and form a backbone of the GMS 
transportation infrastructure. These three main economic corridors will combine 
trade with infrastructure development, investment and other economic 
opportunities of the GMS countries. 
In December 2014, During the Fifth Leaders Meeting on Greater Mekong 
Sub-regional Economic Co-operation Chinese Premier Li Keqiang recommends 
three suggestions with regard to deepening the relations between China and the 
Indochina Peninsula. Countries in these were:  
(1) To conjointly arrange and build an intensive transportation 
network, likewise a variety of industrial co-operation projects; 
(2)  To form an innovative mode of co-operation for fundraising; 
(3) To encourage sustainable and co-ordinated socio-economic development. 
Currently, the countries along the Greater Mekong River are constructing nine 
cross-national highways, linking east to west, and connecting north to south.191 
On the other hand, Within this corridor there are many plans for Air route 
expansion and integration ASEAN and China have already made a deal to allow 
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Chinese airplanes to use ASEAN gateway city airports. Plus the ASEAN ‘open 
skies policy’. 
 
2- China - Bangladesh -India-Myanmar Economic Corridor SEMI-
ACTIVE 
This route includes the four countries mentioned the main part of the 
corridor is a 2,800-km route running as follows; Kolkata-Dhaka-Mandalay-
Kunming. It will include a variety of a chain of railways, motorways, airways, 
waterways and telecom networks.192 
Total trade of the four countries reached USD 4,712 billion in 2015; while 
intra BCIM trade with USD 205 billion. However, India’s exports to China are 
large, representing 7.2% of India’s total exports. Myanmar’s exports to India and 
China are quite important – the two countries are Myanmar’s first and third 
largest trading partners in 2015 respectively. On the import part, China is an 
important source for all 3 countries within the corridor, as is India to associate 
degree extent.193 
Within this corridor, the trade between countries grew by 303% in the last 
10 years. Among the four countries, there are some common products that are 
exported to each other including textiles, apparels, raw materials like copper, iron 
and steel, and motorcycles. 
 
3- China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ACTIVE 
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This Corridor is 3000 kilometers long and starts in Kashgar ending in 
Gwadar, linking the Silk Road Economic Belt within the North and therefore the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road within the South.194 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a planned corridor 
constituting an array of different energy projects, transportation/infrastructure 
networks, and economic free zones within Pakistan.195 
The largest element of CPEC deals with Pakistan’s energy sector. A total 
of $ 33 billion – or approximately 72 percent – of the proposed $46 billion 
investment relates to energy-resource development, including gas and electricity 
generation through natural resources such as coal. 196A further $2.5 billion is 
additionally dedicated to the construction of pipelines for transporting liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) from Iran to the cities of Nawabshah (Sindh) and Gwadar 
(Balochistan).197 
 
4- China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor ACTIVE 
This corridor starts from Xinjiang to Alashankou to the railways of 
Central and West Asia to the Mediterranean Coast and ending within the Arabian 
Peninsula. The corridor generally covers; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan in Central Asia and Iran and Turkey in West Asia 
(although in total including 17 countries in West Asia). This corridor mainly 
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follows the trail of the Ancient Silk Road. 198  CCWAEC requires China to 
coordinate with actors in six states of varying levels of development and political 
stability to emphasize the disparity among the states in this corridor. 
This corridor has two endpoints: Iran, (a significant source of energy), and 
Turkey, (entrance to European markets). The prospective economic benefits of 
this corridor are significant, and it is in China’s interests to see a stable political 
and economic environment in the four Central Asian states that link it to Turkey 
and Iran. As more Chinese funding for BRI projects in Central Asia ought to be 
expected.199 
One anxiety with policy harmonization is the issue of political trust. While 
Sino-Iranian ties are well established, China and Turkey have modest in the way 
of a shared cooperative history. A tension in Xinjiang with China’s Uighur 
population presents possible stress purpose in its relations with Turkey. Central 
Asian states are also reluctant to become too dependent on relations with China, 
with the priority that the quantity of Chinese trade creates potential political 
influence, a concern for countries that have a long history of being dominated by 
larger neighbors. For China’s side, the Central Asian states are seen as susceptible 
to radical Islam and terrorism, and a base for Uighur separatists.200 The bombing 
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embassy in Bishkek underlines the Chinese concern of security threats within the 
region. 
 
5- The New Eurasia Land Bridge ACTIVE 
This corridor will take the form of a global railway line from China’s 
Jiangsu province primarily during a horizontal line west to Rotterdam in Holland. 
According to plans it’ll be 11,800 km long and can serve over 30 countries. On 
this corridor, China opened four freight train routes. These contain a route from 
Chongqing to Duisburg (Germany), a direct route from Wuhan to Mēlník to 
Pardubice (Czech Republic), a route from Chengdu to Lodz (Poland) and one 
from Zhengzhou to Hamburg (Germany). Additionally, on these routes, China has 
issued the policy “one declaration, one inspection, one cargo release” to enhance 
potency and ease.201 
 
6- China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor SEMI-ACTIVE  
The corridor based on the integration of existing Chinese, Mongolian and 
Russian regional development strategies. The corridor is designed to support 
cross-border road and rail links among the three countries. Moreover, the corridor 
focused on two major routes; First: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region-Hohhot-
Mongolia-Russia. Second: Dailan-Shenyang-Changchun-Harbin and Manzhouli 
to Russia’s city Chita. 
 The first meeting of the three countries leaders was on September 11th, 
2014; President Xi Jinping anticipated making joint efforts to build a Silk Road 
Economic Zone, which is highlighting the Silk Road Economic Zone with 
                                                          




Russia’s through the Eurasian Railway and Mongolia’s Grassland Plan, 
additionally building a China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor.202 
 
3.2. - Key Port Cities:  
1-  Kuantan (Malaysia)  2-  Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) 3-  Jakarta and 
Batam Island (Indonesia) 4-  Colombo and Hambantota (Sri 
Lanka) 5-  Gwadar (Pakistan) 6-  Djibouti (near red sea) 7-  
Mombasa (Kenya) 8-  Piraeus (Greece)  
Through this chapter, we will spotlight only on two ports cities, Djibouti 
(near red sea) port and Gwadar (Pakistan) port. 
3.2.1- Djibouti port 
To describe its new naval strategy the Chinese government in 2015, 
officially used the expression “near seas defense, far seas protection” for the first 
time. The “far seas protection” that refers to the Chinese navy’s responsibilities to 
guard China’s interests abroad.  
In 1979 China and Djibouti established first diplomatic relations. In 
November 2015, China built its first overseas military facility in Djibouti that is 
additionally home to the most important U.S. military base in Africa. This 
military base facility indicates that Beijing sees a semi-permanent role for its 
military in protective Chinese interests overseas.203  
In recent years China and Djibouti’s relationship has reinforced as a result 
of security ambitions and complementary economic between the two countries. 
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Djibouti could be a small, generally barren country on the Horn of Africa. 
Geography is its main source of competitive advantage. Djibouti government 
seeks to maximize its location on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes to 
prompt economic development. 204The goal is to become a regional commercial 
business hub like Dubai and Singapore. 205 
Djibouti’s ability to grant a safe environment within a dangerous 
neighborhood has created it enticing to foreign militaries, whose facilities provide 
the government with a considerable quantity of non-tax revenue.206 
 
• It could be a relatively stable country in an in the associate otherwise 
volatile region.  
• A strategically vital position next to the Bab el- Mandeb, a critical 
maritime chokepoint.  
• It serves as the only port for landlocked Ethiopia, East Africa’s largest 
growing economy.  
• It has sought-after to leverage its geography to generate currency by 
leasing land to multiple foreign militaries. 207 
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China’s Strategy in Djibouti: compounding economic and Military Interests. 
China is testing associate rising strategy of using its economic influence to 
advance its security interests. 
China is the main supplier of capital for Djibouti’s formidable development 
program. Chinese companies are providing 37% of the capital, or regarding $1.34 
billion, for the major investment projects comes afoot in Djibouti, which totally 
worth almost $3.65 billion.208 
China is profoundly concerned within the development of Djibouti’s 
infrastructure. Chinese infrastructure companies offer almost 40% ($1.4 billion) 
of funding for Djibouti’s major investment projects  
• Doraleh Multipurpose Port: Phase 1 opened in May 2017. Chinese state-
owned banks and companies established and financed the port. The port is 
expected to add 9 million metric tons of annual service capacity to 
Djibouti’s port infrastructure, quite doubling the amount of cargo it will 
handle.  
• Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway: Chinese state-owned companies have built and 
financed the railroad. They will operate it for 6 years, and one firm owns a 
10% stake in the Djibouti-Ethiopia joint venture which will administer the 
operation of the railroad. Once complete, the railway will connect the 
Doraleh Multipurpose Port to Ethiopia’s capital, enhancing Djibouti’s role 
as the gateway to Ethiopia.  
• Ethiopia-Djibouti Water Pipeline: A Chinese firm built the pipeline, and 
China Eximbank, a lending arm of the Chinese government, provided 
$322 million in funding. This is all but $18 million of the total cost of the 
                                                          




project ($340 million). The pipeline will greatly reduce Djibouti’s water 
shortfall.  
On the other hand, to understand the important role of China in Djibouti let’s 
look at President Ismail Omar Guelleh on the importance of Chinese financing 
 
The Chinese are the only ones to invest in us in all areas: railways, ports, banks, industrial 
parks, etc. The French and Europeans are largely absent subscribers. As for the Americans, 
who have expressed their interest in the Djibouti-Addis pipeline project, their goal is to earn 
a lot, fast and alone: that is understandable but more complicated than expected. The reality 
is that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term partnership in Djibouti.209 — April 2017 
 
Before the establishment of its first military base overseas, Beijing 
has increasingly involved its military in its pursuit of China’s national 
interests in Africa using its navy to secure its interests in the Gulf of Aden.  
 
Doraleh Multipurpose Port 
Chinese companies are owners and developers of Doraleh Multipurpose 
Port, which opened in May 2017,210 a joint venture formed by China Merchants 
and the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) in 2013. China 
Merchants spent $185 million to acquire a 23.5 percent stake in PDSA.211 China 
Eximbank subsequently extended a $340 million loan to finance the construction 
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of Doraleh Multipurpose Port. 212  It was built by China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. 
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries provided equipment.213 China Merchants and 
DPFZA jointly operate the port.214 
The new port will significantly increase the volume of cargo that Djibouti 
can handles. Djibouti serviced cargo totaling 6.5 million metric tons in 2016.215 
The first phase of Doraleh Multipurpose Port, which opened in May 2017, will 
add 9 metric tons of annual capacity, raising the amount of cargo by 138 percent. 
The second Phase of Doraleh Multipurpose Port will more expand the port’s 
capacity to 29 metric tons per year.216 The ability to receive Capsize vessels and 
transfer goods to smaller ships for onward shipment to smaller ports will increase 
Djibouti’s role as a transshipment hub for eastern and southern Africa. 
Djibouti International Free Trade Zone  
DIFTZ will be the largest free trade zone in Africa, and Djibouti wants to 
attract light industries such as assembly lines for vehicles and consumer goods to 
the DIFTZ.217  
                                                          
212 International Monetary Fund. "Djibouti : 2016 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Djibouti." IMF. Accessed August 26, 2018. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/04/06/Djibouti-2016-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-
Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-44807. 
213 Muluken Yewondwossen, "Doraleh Multi Purpose Port's Heavy Equipments Arrive at Djibouti." Capital 
Ethiopia Newspaper. August 22, 2016. Accessed August 26, 2018. 
http://capitalethiopia.com/2016/08/22/doraleh-multi-purpose-ports-heavy-equipments-arrive-djibouti/. 
214 "HOME." CHINA MERCHANTS PORT HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED. Accessed August 26, 
2018. http://www.cmport.com.hk/enTouch/about/History.aspx. 
215” Grand plans for Djibouti.” World Port Development, April 2017. Accessed August 26, 2018. p. 25, 
http://www.portdedjibouti.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Djibouti-Article.pdf 
216 Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority, “Djibouti Multipurpose Port,” Accessed August 26, 2018. 
http://dpfza.gov.dj/?q=building-region/djibouti-multipurpose-port. 
217 Oxford Business Group, “New Free Trade Areas to Boost Djibouti's Economic Growth,” Oxford Business 




China Merchants plans to repeat the “Port-Zone-City” model is used to 
transform Shekou, China, from a small fishing village into a commercial hub. The 
president of China Merchants’ parent company, China Merchants Group, told the 
China Daily in March 2017 that “making full use of Djibouti’s geographical 
advantages, we are in the process of creating the country the ‘Shekou of East 
Africa’—a hub for regional shipping, logistics, and trade.”218 Now that Doraleh 
Multipurpose Port is built, Currently, China Merchants initiated the second phase 
of convert Djibouti into the “Shekou of East Africa.  
Again, China Merchants and other Chinese firms are financing and 
building the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ) next to Doraleh 
Multipurpose Port. 219  Construction began in January 2017 by, Dalian Port 
Corporation Limited China’s largest public port operator, in which China 
Merchants owns a 21 percent stake.220 China Merchants settled two joint ventures 
with other Chinese firms to facilitate develop the DIFTZ. One will invest in 
commercial and infrastructure projects in the DIFTZ, and the other will manage 
these investments, The first joint venture plans an initial investment of $30 
million.221  
 
3.2.2-   The China Pakistan economic corridor CPEC 
Sino-Pakistani relations 
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The relations between China and Pakistani have evolved over time from 
primarily a Cold War response to external threats to a relationship that 
additionally encompasses domestic stability for each country, emphasizing the 
importance of the bilateral relationship. China’s importance has been 
delineated as “the cornerstone of Pakistan’s strategic foreign policy.”222 In 1996 
President Jiang Zemin made China’s first state visit Pakistan, and announced the 
establishment of an “all around the cooperative partnership.” In 2005 the 
relationship deepened when China and Pakistan signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Good Neighborly Relations, and announced the beginning of 
negotiations for a free trade agreement. In April 2015 President Xi Jinping made a 
state visit and signed the 51 Memorandums of Understanding established the all-
weather strategic partnership, which is generally viewed as China’s highest level 
of bilateral relations, involving the “full pursuit of cooperation and 
development.”223 The resulting relationship has expanded to include extensive 
trade ties and geopolitical considerations, as Pakistan become a bridge to the 
Middle East. However, Pakistan was used as a diplomatic conduit for establishing 
ties with the USA and Saudi Arabia, Currently, Pakistan has come to be regarded 
as “a central part of China’s transforming from a regional to a global power.” 
 
Global Trade Corridor 
The Indian Ocean region is recognized the world’s most vital trade and 
energy corridor. The global trade corridor accounts for the transportation of an 
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outsized volume of international long-haul maritime cargo and nearly 80% of the 
overall traffic of crude products for the entire world.224 The Strait of Hormuz, is 
the most important corridor, links and facilitates commerce between regions of 
the globe.225 Moreover, almost half of the world’s trade by value is routed through 
this chokepoint.226The east-west shipping lane is the main global trade corridor 
that accounts for thousands of merchant’s vessels in the region. 227 
Energy plays important role in influencing the geopolitical strategies of 
those countries, any such disturbance in its supply would have severe economic, 
political and security consequences for the entire world. The closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz will cause turmoil of seaborne trade and rise in the global oil prices.228 
Energy supply to industrialized and developing economies is routed through this 
region. The U.S, China, Japan, European countries and many others are the main 
importers of crude oil from the Gulf region,229 almost 17 million barrels of crude 
oil supply accounting for 20% of the world’s per day pass through this main 
chokepoint.230 
 
 Gwadar Sea Port 
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The china Pakistan economic corridor CPEC is meant not solely to 
create obtainable to China, the shortest energy supply route from the Middle East 
and Africa however also augment trade and cooperation, therefore reinventing 
Pakistan as an energy corridor between South Asia, China, and Central Asia. The 
Gwadar port ultimately can provide China with an entry point into the Arabian 
Gulf and consequently widen its geopolitical influence. The deep-sea port is 
located at Gwadar in Balochistan, 460 km west of Karachi at the top of the 
Arabian Sea, approximately 75 km east of Iran‘s border with Pakistan and 400 km 
from the Strait of Hormuz, which is the sole sea passage to the Persian Gulf from 
the open sea. Around 80% of world oil tankers move from the Persian Gulf while 
45 %of world oil route takes place through the Strait of Hormuz. Gwadar is 
already connected to Karachi through the Makran Coastal highway, built with 
Chinese assistance of $200 m. China and Pakistan attempt to link the Port via 
Indus Highway with Ratodero and KKH which leads to Kashgar – around 414 km 
from Sost-Tashkurgan (China-Pakistan border) and more reaches to Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.231 
Both Gwadar and Kashgar currently appear to fall under China‘s ‗Go 
West‘and Pakistan‘s ‗Look East‘policy. The cornerstone of Pakistan‘s policy is 
the establishment of a mutually beneficial relationship with China while China 
primarily aims at developing its comparatively backward western regions, 
specifically Xinjiang which is restive as a consequence. The ‗Look West‘policy 
serves a twin purpose for China: peace and stability in Xinjiang through economic 
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development also use this province for flat energy and trade transactions with 
energy-rich Central Asia.232 
Gwadar Port will play an essential role in the economic revival of Pakistan. 
Pakistan‘s geographical proximity to the landlocked and comparatively under-
developed western China and the mutual trust that marks Pak-China relations are 
two of the main causes for Chinese interest in building the Gwadar Sea Port and 
developing Kashgar as a special economic zone. The two projects signal the 
transformation of friendly relations into comprehensive cooperation. 
The expected revenues from oil and gas transit and land to sea trade via 
Pakistan can total around $1,000,000 per year.233 It was thought initially that the 
Gwadar Port will serve only Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan via 
Afghanistan due to geographic proximity but now with Kashgar, an economic 
zone connected to Gwadar by a land route, the Port will not only serve 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but also Afghanistan can gain from the shorter 
distance it offers for transit. 
China decided to build an oil refinery at Gwadar and pipeline from 
Gwadar to Xinjiang will provide Persian Gulf‘s and African oil to Western China 
by reducing the distance by numerous thousand km. The entire length of the gas 
pipeline from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang via Pakistan is 2500 km whereas the 
distance from Xinjiang to eastern ports of Shanghai and Beijing through inland 
China is 4500 km. The distance from Shanghai Port to Gwadar and the Persian 
Gulf via the Indian Ocean is 10,000 km. It is evident that trade and energy 
transport from East-African Persian and the Gulf States via Gwadar through 
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Pakistan can scale back the distance of about 15000 km to a distance of simply 
2500 km. It’s not only cost effective however additionally safe and secure in 
comparison to the maritime route. Presently Chinese oil tankers take 20 days 
average to reach the Gulf. Moreover, after the completion of the high-speed rail 
and road networks across Pakistan, oil tankers from eastern China would get to 
Gwadar, right on the mouth of the Gulf, within 48 hours.234 
Major Projects of Economic Corridor 
• Karakorum Highway (Havelian in the Abbottabad District to Thakot) 
• Upgrading of Karachi–Peshawar Railway Line 
• Jhimpir wind Power project 
• Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG Terminal and Pipeline Project 
• Thar Block II 2x330MW Coal-Fired Power project 
• Thar Block II 3.8Mt/a mining Project 
• Gwadar-Ratodero Motorway 
• Karachi-Lahore Motorway (Multan to Sukkur) 
• The Gwadar Port East Bay Expressway Project 
• Gwadar International Airport 
• China Central Television 
• Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline235 
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Egypt and China economic and political relation  
1-The history of China’s policy towards Egypt and the Middle 
East 
First of all, Egypt was the first Arabic country that had diplomatic 
representation with China in 1928. First of September 1943 Cairo announcement 
was declared from the Egyptian capital that the Japanese occupation to Taiwan is 
void as it is a part of the Chinese lands and due to the convergence between the 
goals of each of the Egyptian revolution 1952 and also the Chinese revolution 
1949 Egypt took the initiative in 1956 to Acknowledge the People's Republic of 
China and established the diplomatic Egyptian relation at the extent of 
ambassadors.236 
Egypt was attractive partner to China due to its government’s Powerful 
opposition to imperialism while China’s Communist regime was willing to get 
away of its isolation and establish a leadership position in the developing world. 
In April 1955, at the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia, Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser first met Zhou, an encounter that sparked an immediate 
friendship between the two former revolutionaries.237  
Emphatically, In order to allay fears about their communist orientation, 
China’s leaders had to highlight the status of Muslims in Chinese society. 
Providing Aid to Egypt served as a plan of action to single out Chinese Muslims 
                                                          
236 Kyle Haddad-Fonda, Revolutionary Allies: Sino-Egyptian and Sino-Algerian Relations in the Bandung 
Decade. 2013. P ,7. 
237 Ibid, 1 
89 
 
and turn them in one hand, to endorse the Chinese government’s outspoken 
backing for anti-imperialist causes around the globe and in another hand, to 
sympathize with their co-religionists in the Middle East, through providing 
opportunities for Chinese Muslims to participate dynamically in international 
politics.238  
As Polanyi 239argues that; Instead of economy being embedded in social 
relation, social relations are embedded in the economic system. We can get to the 
conclusion that the social relations are defiantly embedded in the political system 
as well. 
Between the 1950s and 1960, China’s opened the door with the Middle 
East for cultural and public exchanges. In May 1955, Egypt and China signed a 
“Minutes of cultural talks” exchange program between the two countries. Then in 
August 1955the first pilgrimage group from China visit Egypt. In 1956 they 
signed the “Sino-Egypt Agreement on Cultural Cooperation. Also, the Egyptian 
Minister of Trade and Industry visit China in August 1955 and signed the “Sino-
Egyptian Trade Agreements and Protocols” which led to the mutual establishment 
of trade representatives offices in 1956240 
In point of fact, in 1955 and 1956, China’s national and international goals 
were so closely united as to be indivisible. The Chinese government had to show 
not only that it did not mistreat its Muslim population, but also to ensure those 
Muslims were fully engaged to the Muslim countries. The motivation of the 
Chinese government’s to promote Islam actually strengthened its position at home 
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when public support for Nasser’s government became a propaganda tool that 
China’s leaders could use to improve their relations with their own Muslim 
citizens.241 
It’s important to mention that China and Arab countries share a long 
history of exemplary interactions. The past 2,000 years have witnessed 
uninterrupted exchanges between Arab peoples and the Chinese through land and 
sea links that expedited mutual learning between two great civilizations. 
Moreover, over the past four years, we’ve maintained frequent high-level 
exchanges, as well as President Xi’s flourishing visits to the Middle East and also 
the visits to China by the heads of state of Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and 
Palestine. Such exchanges have contributed to enhanceing political trust and kept 
bilateral ties consecutively at a high level. China has upgraded its strategic 
relations with 11 Arab countries. It’s supported Arab countries in exploring their 
own methods of development, and Palestine in restoring the lawful rights of its 
people. Arab countries, on their part, have given China valuable support on 
problems regarding its core and main interests.242 
2- China’s culture approach 
 
The cultural exchanges between China and the Middle East countries 
based on substantive cooperation and contact visits with continuing folk art 
exchanges like acrobatics, dancing, and singing, they organized cultural weeks, 
film festivals, seminars, art exhibition, health collaboration, sports, and diverse 
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activities. This included implementation plans and a series of cultural cooperation 
agreements to address and resolve the problems from institution construction 
level.243 
China’s cultural exchanges with Middle Eastern countries also entered the 
third period of rapid development. From 1991 to 1999, China has set up a Sino -
Egypt. In 2000 and 2004, China established the “Sino-Africa Forum” and “Sino-
Arab Forum” which institutionalizes the cultural exchanges between China and 
the Middle East. Particularly, in 2004, the Arab Friendship Association was 
established “by the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries (CPAFFC) and the relevant enterprises and institutions, social 
organizations and interested people of all circles. It is a national and non-profit 
social organization for the purpose of promoting relations between China and 
Arab countries, expanding international cooperation and safeguarding world 
peace. 
On the other hand, China is a symbol of seeking to acknowledge in Islam 
religion as The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said:  "Seek knowledge 
even unto China". As some have discerned, the source of the hadith is unreliable. 
There are yet different hadiths similar to this one: The Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) said: "The seeking of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim." - 
Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 74. Also, The Prophet Muhammad (peace is upon him) said: 
“One who treads a path in search of knowledge has his path to Paradise made 
easy by God…” - Riyadh us-Saleheen, 245.244 
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The latest report by the Center for Studies of the Forum on China-Arab 
Cooperation more than 18,000 Arab students are studying in China. The report 
added that China has established 12 Confucius Institutes and 4 Confucian Classes 
in nine Arab countries since 2004. The total number of students participating in 
the academic training was about 70,000. About 5,000 cultural activities were 
organized, with some 680,000 students. The number of Arab students in China 
rose from 1,130 in 2004 to 18050 in 2016, with an annual growth rate of 26 
percent, while the number of students studying in Arab countries rose from 242 in 
2004 to 2,433 in 2016, with 21% of annual growth rate. 
In the same context, Liao Jing, an Arabic professor at the Shanghai 
University of International Studies in China, said in her recent research entitled 
"Adaptation of Arab Students Coming to China" she highlighted that the number 
of Arab students in China is booming. They reached a record number Thanks to 
the friendly relationship between the Arab countries and China. In 2016 the 
number of students reached14 thousand students, an increase of 13 percent 
compared to 2015.245 
Recently, The Egyptian Chinese cultural exchange reinforced the mutual 
understanding between the two countries. The culture exchange was carried out in 
many fields including Education cooperation that is regarded as one of the most 
important fields to provide annual exchanging mechanism between seniors, the 
cooperation between educational establishments with the mutual acknowledgment 
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of education certificates and mutual projects both countries universities and 
increasing the number of the newcomers student every year, the development of 
teaching Chinese language at many Egyptian universities (Ainshams_ Cairo_ 
Tanta_ Alminia_ Helwan246  and finally Port-said University), and establishing 
education organizations including the most important Confucianism institute in 
both Cairo University and Port-said University.247 
Egypt has tried to prove its political quality to China in other ways. In 
May 2017, China called for the return of all Uighur students from overseas, 
members of the Muslim ethnic minority in the far western region of Xinjiang. 
Enthusiastically, the Sisi administration heeded the call rounding up hundreds of 
Uighurs studying at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University for deportation. Those students 
were virtually definitely sent en masse to China’s massive detention camps for 
Uighurs upon arriving back in the country.248 
In 2018, The Ambassador of China in Cairo said that Al-Azhar Al-Sharif 
establishes among its students the values of peace, coexistence, and patriotism. 
This is what makes the countries of the world keen to send their students to this 
ancient university to be pillars of peace and social stability. Iguo expressed thanks 
to Al-Azhar for sponsoring the Chinese students studying in Al-Azhar, expressing 
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his country's aspiration for further cooperation with Al-Azhar in scientific 
fields.249 
3- China’s comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt 
Egyptian-Chinese relations consider as one of the most significant 
bilateral axes in Africa and the MENA region.  
Both, Egyptian president Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi and Chinese President Xi 
Jinping held talks to improve their countries’ bilateral relationship to a 
“comprehensive strategic partnership In December 2014.” The two leaders 
assured to enhance political, economic, cultural, military, and technological 
cooperation together with management at the regional and international level. 
Since 2014, it shows that a new era of strategic economic and political ties has 
certainly initiated between the two countries.250 
For Beijing, the rising strategic alliance with Egypt aiming to enhancing 
its power and influence in the Middle East, Moreover, increase its commercial 
engagement, and reinforce its strategic position at the expense of the U.S. 
Egypt and China comprehensive strategic partnership not only motivated 
by economic imperatives but also strategic intentions play important role. China 
perceives Sisi’s regime as a partner who can open the door to achieve influence 
within the Middle East countries at Washington’s expense Since China-Egypt 
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relations promise unprecedented opportunities and far-reaching prospects, China 
intend to wedge itself between Egypt and the U.S.251 
Moreover, president Xi expressed China’s support for the Egyptian 
people’s right to decide on their own political system, together with its criticism 
of external attempts to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs. Particularly, after the 
Egyptian military toppled elected president Mohammed Morsi. This is consider 
concrete evidence that China has no qualms to deal with the Sisi regime and 
remains silent relating to Egypt’s internal affairs.252 
  Egypt is one among the countries on the front line of the regional war on 
terrorism, so that, China consider Egypt as a major partner in the war against 
terrorism in the Middle East.253Furthermore, China has escalating concern over the 
threat by the Islamic State and it’s necessitating to restrain the threat far-off from 
China’s borders. Both countries face exceptional security challenges. Together 
they seek to combat terrorism and extremism by providing intelligence, arresting 
and repatriating suspects, collecting evidence, and eliminate terrorist funding 
sources.254  
  In addition, China views strong strategic ties with Egypt as part of its 
agenda to expand its political influence and commercial connections globally. 
Egypt provides China with an entrance to the African continent’s natural 
resources, additionally as an enormous market potential for Chinese goods. Egypt 
is linked to African countries through trade agreements and tax exemptions. These 
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create many industrialization advantages and investment opportunities for both 
countries with potential to exporting into African markets.255 
Cairo and Beijing announced a five-year, multi-sector cooperation 
agreement. During the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt on January 
20-22, 2016, this agreement injected a substance into the “comprehensive 
strategic partnership” formed during President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s trips to 
China in December 2014 and September 2015. Egypt and China additionally 
declared 2016 as “the Egyptian-Chinese cultural year.”256 
As such we witnessed China step up its regional profile early last year 
when President Xi visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt,257 and Iran, and released its first 
Arab Policy Paper to gesture its goal of increased engagement in the Mideast.258 
By the side of the eighth ministerial meeting of the China-Arab States 
Cooperation Forum. Chinese President Xi declared that China and the Arab 
countries had agreed to launch a "Sino-Arab future-oriented strategic partnership 
of comprehensive cooperation and common development."Calling the Arab states 
China's natural partners in Belt and Road cooperation. 
Xi added that China stands ready to work with the Arab side to coordinate 
the development strategies and actions."We must strive to uphold peace and 
stability in the Middle East. Xi said that China and the Arab states have to 
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strengthen strategic trust, stay committed to dialogue and consultation, uphold the 
principle of sovereignty, champion inclusive reconciliation and fight terrorism.259 
China’s interests in the Mideast because a source of energy, providing 
more than half of China’s crude oil imports. It is also a hub for market access in 
Europe and Africa, and the region is a forward front for counter-terrorism, 
especially for China and other Asian states that continue to count on the Mideast 
for energy imports. Fundamentally, they need security and regional stability of 
supply lines. 
4- Egypt and China strategic partnership  
Since the mid-1950s, Egypt and China have maintained friendly and equal 
relations in political, economic, and cultural exchanges  
On each Chinese leader’s first trip to the region, Egypt is the only Middle 
Eastern country visited by Xi, Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zemin. China saw the logic to 
encourage sensible relations with Egypt, an important regional player and the 
home to Arab League headquarters.260 
As we mention before Gamal Abdel Nasser, former president of Egypt and 
Cold War schemer, was not averse to playing hardball with powerful countries. In 
1955, Nasser grew bored with of dallying from Washington on a long-stalled arms 
deal. He surprised the West by approaching the Soviet Union, buying military 
equipment through Czechoslovakia, and flaming fears of a Middle Eastern arms 
race. 
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Six decades later, Egypt is looking for the best political bargain it can get 
once again, creating diplomatic overtures to Beijing and Moscow whereas 
maintaining its critical U.S. and the Persian Gulf backers As under Nasser, the 
Egyptian leadership has become annoyed with the U.S. The relationship grew 
frosty through the presidency of Obama, who refused to invite al-Sisi to 
Washington amid accusations of human rights violations. Sisi has since made a 
state visit to Donald Trump’s White House, but still, the long-term strategy 
remains unclear.261 
Egypt is a traditional U.S. partner with which China is forging ever-deeper 
ties. For decades, U.S had thought-about Egypt to be among its most dependable 
and cogent allies within the Middle East.” However, this stability 
could have returned at a price.  Over the years, the U.S. administration long 
neglected the autocracy, corruption, and abuses endured under the Mubarak 
regime, and provided Egypt with significant military and economic aid in 
exchange for Egypt’s pro-U.S. orientation.262 However, both countries relations 
tumbled somewhat within the wake of the political turmoil and Mubarak’s ouster 
in 2011. On June 2014, when Sisi took office the relations have continuing to 
deteriorate, exacerbated partly by the military intervention that toppled 
Morsi. The U.S. momentarily cut off the military aid to Egypt, even though the 
human rights issue and freedoms still solid a pall over Washington-Cairo 
relations.263 
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Moreover, Egypt and U.S. bilateral trade decreased from $7.8 billion in 
2014 to $6.1 billion in 2015.264 Consequently, Egypt may become more reliant on 
Chinese investments and also as an export market alternative to the U.S. for the 
long term. The current tensions in Egypt-U.S. relations have allowed China to 
insert itself as a wedge between the two countries to replace U.S. as Egypt’s main 
economic and strategic partner. 
The Sisi administration is set to balance its partnership with Washington 
by diversifying its alternatives to Egypt’s traditional reliance on the U.S.  As a 
consequence, Egypt has welcome Chinese political support and economic 
investment. China, however, sees great strategic potential in Egypt, as a key 
partner in fulfilling its broader regional and global ambitions. Consequently, 
China can for certain know the way to require advantage of the situation at this 
stage, mainly in the economic sphere that most interests Egypt. 
Sisi visit China more than four times and Xi’s reciprocal visit to Egypt in 
Jan 2016 marked China’s rising position in the Middle East and also the shifting 
geopolitical in the MENA region.265 
It’s necessary similarly to grasp why the Sisi administration considers 
relations with Beijing to be essential. There are two reasons:  
Economically, Egypt like several African countries has been dynamically 
looking for Chinese investment, seeing it as an alternative to the Western 
investment with its rigorous conditions. Egypt and China have harmonized 
activities in numerous fields and the ability to complement each other’s 
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advantages. Chinese investment is essential for Egypt’s economic growth and for 
declining the unemployment rate, that create a tangible threat to the regime 
stability.266 
Geopolitical, Egypt desire to send a concrete message to its previous U.S. 
partner alluding to its strategic alternatives and its frustration with the U.S. 
attempts to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs. Strategic cooperation with China 
is convenient to Egypt’s desire to shape a sovereign foreign policy based on 
purely Egyptian interests and is not limited to international and regional axes. 
Accompanied by a high-level Egyptian delegation President Sisi 
participated in The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing 
in September 2018. President Sisi noted the development of bilateral relations 
between Egypt and China and the achievement of comprehensive strategic 
relations, reflecting the confidence between the two countries. He pointed to the 
economic and investment cooperation between the two countries which has 
developed over the last four years, which will greatly benefit during that period, 
particularly in the trade volume between the two countries. The President 
welcomed the high-level exchange of visits between the two countries during the 
past four years, referring to the four visits he made to China, as well as the visit of 
the Chinese president to Cairo.267 
                                                          
266 Ibid. 
267 Akhbar Elyoum, " Sisi praises China's support for development in Egypt, especially in the administrative 









Al-Sisi stressed Egypt's keenness to further strengthen and activate the 
mechanisms of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, especially during its 
presidency of the African Union in 2019, in light of the consensus available on 
the development priorities of African countries and China. President Sisi affirmed 
Egypt's support for the Chinese President's "Belt and Road" initiative, especially 
as Egypt is a cultural and historical partner of China in the initiative to revive the 
Silk Road. Al-Sisi mentions that: "The BRI goes further than its commercial 
aspect to shape a number of additional cultural and civilization axes which aim to 
accomplish interconnection among peoples, the goals which Egypt has long 
supported and sought to strengthen."268 
President Sisi called for greater concerted efforts to promote ties between 
Cairo and Beijing in all domains. Also said the FOCAC confirmed that 
China hooked up immense importance to Africa's development. Egypt completely 
supports China in hosting a flourishing summit, “Egypt speaks positively of China 
for upholding a just stance on the Middle East issues and is ready to strengthen 
coordination with China in multilateral areas”.269 
5- The BRI and Suez Canal  
Egypt is poised – and eager – to play a pivotal role in China’s “Belt and 
Road” initiative. Indeed, Due to the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, Egypt 
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may finally end up actually turning into China’s “gateway to Europe,” even more 
so than the Eastern European countries that have vied for the title.270 
An economic cooperation agreement signed in Cairo in 1995 between Egypt 
and China.271 The Agreement for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (AECC) 
aims at encouraging trade exchange and developing economic cooperation and 
stipulates the establishment of a joint committee for trade exchange and economic 
cooperation. The committee's first meeting was held in Beijing in October 1996.272 
President Hosni Mubarak's visit to China in 1999, Chinese governmental 
and non-governmental delegations began a series of visits to Egypt with the 
express purpose of gauging the investment climate and business atmosphere in 
Egypt. During the visit made by President Hosni Mubarak to China in 1999, a 
contract was signed for planning an SEZ between the Egyptian-Chinese Joint 
Company and the Chinese TEDA Company. The SEZ was to be located in the 
North Western Gulf of Suez.273 
The New Suez Canal is a parallel canal to the old one; it was constructed 
to increase the benefits from the Suez Canal and is considered the flagship project 
for the current government. It’s necessary to notice that the project was funded by 
investment certificates issued to Egyptians only. The project was thought-out a 
national triumph, in barely a matter of days the government was capable to collect 
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EGP 61 billion through investment certificates and rather than spending a period 
of three years to complete the project, it was finalized within a year. The goal of 
the project was to maximize earnings from the Suez Canal by increasing its 
capacity from 49ships/day to 97 ships/day and the revenues from around USD 5.5 
billion to USD 13 billion by 2023. 
The main goals of the New Suez Canal are: 1) Attract a lot of ships to 
utilize this maritime route, reaffirming it as a focal international maritime route. 2) 
double the longest doable elements of the waterway to facilitate traffic in each 
direction. 3) Reduce the transit time for ships from 18 to 11 hours for the 
southbound convoy. 4) Decrease the wait time for vessels to become 3 hours at 
the most rather than of 8-11 hours, so lowering on trip costs. 5) Enhance the 
capability of the waterway to accommodate more ships daily to satisfy the 
expected growth in world trade. 6) Enhance the Egyptian national economy by 
boosting the flow of foreign currency in the country and turning Egypt into an 
international logistics center.274 
On August 9th, 2015, Al Sisi issued Decree No. 330/2015 to establish a 
special economic zone (SEZ) in the area bordering to the Canal, as an extension 
to the long-term projected regional development plan to transform the strategic 
waterway into an industrial hub, the “Suez Canal Economic Zone” (SCZone) 
across over an area of 461 square kilometers and 6 maritime ports. 
The Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone located on the major trade route 
between Asia and Europe, more than 8% of world trade passes through every year. 
Spanning 461 km2, almost two-thirds the size of Singapore, the SCZone consists 
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of two integrated areas (Ain Sokhna with Ain Sokhna Port - East Port Said with 
East Port Said Port), two development areas (Qantara West - East Ismailia), and 
four ports (West Port Said Port - Adabiya Port - Al Tor Port - Al Arish Port). 
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Every development and integrated area creates investment opportunities in 
industrial and commercial enterprises, infrastructure and real estate development, 
logistics, amenities, and state-of-the-art technology. Designed port expansions 
will maximize the capacity for managing maritime traffic and for providing 
related services.276 
Egypt signed several International trade agreements, which further 
enhance market access include: Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA),Egypt-
EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) free trade agreement 












,Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement, Agadir Agreement (free trade zone among the 
Arabic Mediterranean Nations), COMESA Agreement (Common Market for 
Eastern & Southern Africa), Egypt-Turkey Free Trade Agreement, and Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZ). 
Various investment opportunities exist in at the (SCZone)  and therefore the 
development nearby areas; we’ve divided these opportunities into 6 segments:  
1) Ports & Logistics field: Opportunities exist within both “the development 
of East Port Said Port and Ain Sokhna Port” and the associated terminals 
and facilities, as well as instrumentation terminals. 
2) Maritime Services field: opportunities exist within the development of 
maritime-related activities as well as shipbuilding and ship repair services, 
vessel scrapping, bunkering, and recycling.  
3) Industry field: Potential opportunities in East Port Said, Ain Sokhna, and 
Qantara for light, medium and heavy industry. Contain consumer 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, automotive, food processing, textile, and 
petrochemicals.  
4) ICT field: the SCZone creates several opportunities to engage in R&D, 
software development, among other activities. Particularly that the city of 
Ismailia is designed to become Egypt’s Tech Valley and additionally the 
administrative center for SCZone. 
5) Renewable Energy field: the renewable sector is highly promising with 
potential developmers to build clean energy industries using solar and 
wind farm energy. 
6) Infrastructure field: Opportunities exist in infrastructure is infinite and is 
that the most required at this stage. 
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On the other hand, The Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone) have 
several Incentives As Companies operating within the SCZone are entitled to: 100% 
foreign ownership of companies, 100% foreign control of import/export activities, 
Imports exempt from customs duties and sales tax, Customs duties on exports to 
Egypt imposed on imported components only not the final product, and Fast-track 
visa services.277 
Djibouti, Egypt, and Ethiopia are the hotspots of China’s engagement in 
Africa within the scope of BRI as well as Zambia, Tanzania, and Angola. No 
other country invests more within the development of Egypt’s Suez Canal 
Corridor than China. A Chinese company signed a contract on constructing the 
new multi-purpose terminal at Alexandria Port (Egypt). The Hutchison Ports 
Company based in Hong Kong operated the port. China Railway Construction 
Corporation is currently constructing a 70 km railway from the expanding capital 
Cairo to its surroundings.278 
Moreover, Egypt has a huge skilled workforce that also happens to be 
competitively priced. Taken into account Egypt’s labor force to be one of the 
largest and youngest within the region is roughly 27.6 million. Also, Egypt’s the 
labor force is highly trained, with 300,000 university graduates entering the labor 
market annually (20,000 are engineers, 15,000 are science and technology 
graduates and 22,500 are foreign language speakers).279 
For China, strategic interest in Egypt unlike China’s other Middle Eastern 
partners; ties with Egypt aren’t actuated by oil imports, however by an additional 
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geographic calculus. China has been desperate to increase its presence in the 
crucial canal for many years – back in 2000 when the-President Jiang Zemin 
visited Egypt; he expressed China’s concern in “the development of Egypt’s Suez 
Gulf particular Economic Zone.” Chinese investment in the Suez Canal starts for 
the next decade to take off under Xi Jinping and his new “Belt and Road” 
initiative.280 
For the duration of President Xi’s visit to Egypt, both countries signed 
deals in investment and aid worth billions of dollars, including the development 
of the Suez Canal axis and economic and trade cooperation in (SCZone). These 
deals aim to increase Chinese presence in Egypt’s Suez Canal zone from 32 
Chinese companies, which are investing more than $400 million to 100 
companies and an investment of $2.5 billion in the next phase of the 
project.281 The agreements also include the first phase of construction of a new 
Egyptian administrative capital, a $1 billion financing agreement for Egypt’s 
central bank, and a $700 million loan to the state-owned National Bank of 
Egypt.282  
In fact, Xi expressly encouraged Chinese firms to invest in Egypt’s major 
projects, including building a new administrative capital outside of Cairo 
developing and the Suez Canal Corridor. Egypt and China have already taken 
steps to collaborate on those projects.283  
On the sidelines of the official visit of Al Sisi to China in 2018, the 
Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority and the Chairman of the Suez Canal 
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Economic Zone Authority Mohab Mamesh, signed 3 agreements with major 
Chinese firms in the fields of spinning, weaving, gypsum board manufacturing, 
non-woven products, About one billion dollars, to work in the area of Teda 
industrial zone economic Suez Canal Ain Sokhna.284 
For Egypt, the strategic geographical location of the Suez Canal 
offers it an important status, explaining why it’s the only African country to 
officially sign bilateral agreements with China on BRI. The initiative merely 
cannot afford to exclude Egypt. Moreover, the inclusion of Djibouti has been a 
result of “logical‟ assumptions than from official pronouncements. This can 
surely be explained under the quest for global dominance and the geopolitics of 
the horn of Africa as stated earlier. Djibouti and Egypt are exceptionally critical 
because of 30% of world shipping going through the entrance of the Red Sea from 
the Indian Ocean and on to the Suez Canal. 285 However, other than this, the BRI 
initiative in Egypt is anticipated to own different positive impacts. The Egypt-
China Suez Economic Zone a result of the initiative can produce over 10,000 jobs 
for Egyptians. On the other hand, President Al-Sisi gets to have a partner in China 
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for his ambitious projects which is the new administrative capital aside from 
Cairo.286 
Tiezzi (2016) 287  argues that the Maritime Silk road is unachievable 
without Egypt. This makes Egypt an indispensable member of BRI. The Suez 
Canal is an added sweetener financing to the core project with the” road‟ China 
gave $ 1 billion to Egyptian central bank, and $700 million loans to the National 
Bank, with the colossal sums of $ 230 million and $ 45 billion respectively being 
the costs that China will foot. The infrastructural impact has already been 
highlighted. 
Tiezzi (2016) says “imagine the New Suez Canal, accomplished with 
Chinese funding and managed by a Chinese company as the gateway between 
Europe and Asia”. The advantages are going to be outsized. Chinese footprints in 
matters of worldwide security, and exclusively the Mediterranean region are 
going to be felt. 
Finally, at the previous chapter we explained the implementation of BRI in 
Djibouti in comparison with the China-Egypt Suez Economic Zone, we can argue 
that before the BRI initiative, considerable efforts have been made by the 
Egyptian government to liberalize and improve the investment regime in Egypt. 
Efforts have also been made to the court and attract not only Chinese investors but 
also worldwide investment, Although that no other country invests more in the 
development of Egypt’s Suez Canal corridor than China, Egypt government more 
strong and independent than Djibouti and will not accept China ownership for the 
port and will not accept military base on the Suez Canal corridor. 
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In comparison with the Gwadar port the implementation of BRI in Suez 
Economic Zone will be more comfortable and convenient for both countries as 
there is no other country complain about the project like India in case of Gwadar, 
But it’s the opposite as the BRI in Suez Economic Zone will improve the trade 
and economic scale for the Middle East and African countries. 
 
6- China and Egypt Trade & investments  
The investment profile of Chinese firms in Egypt in 2008 was typified by 
a duality: on the one hand, a small number of large firms exist, on the other; many 
of relatively small investments, mostly in the manufacturing sectors. The average 
registered capital of each firm stood at only $400, 000. Of the 567 Chinese 
invested companies, 461 were in manufacturing sectors accounting for 
approximately 45% of all inward investments. The largest numbers of firms were 
established in textiles (167 firms, accounting for nearly 13% of all Chinese 
investment in Egypt). The second hottest sector was chemicals (140 
corporations, once more accounting for around 13% of all investment). Following 
this, engineering (72 companies), construction materials (47 companies) and food 
(23 companies) were the foremost vital industrial sectors.288 
In 2008, Egypt hosted almost 600 Chinese firms, around 5% of all 
officially recognized subsidiaries of Chinese TNCs. this number had risen to 900 
invested firms by 2009. Though Egypt has boundless natural resources, Egypt is 
willing to increase the volumes of Chinese OFDI.289 
                                                          
288 Ahmad El-Gohari, Dylan Sutherland,9. 
289 Ibid, 3. 
111 
 
In fact, China was the 28th largest investor in Egypt (GAFI, 2008) by 
2008. However, this doesn’t exemplify the rapid increase in investment and also a 
significant number of Chinese firms entering the Egyptian market since 2000. By 
2008 a total of 567 Chinese firms had made investments in Egypt, with a 
registered capital totaling nearly $225 million and a paid-in capital of $142 
million.290 In 2017 the number increase to $150.6 million291 
Two key observations with regards to the investment profile of Chinese 
firms in Egypt in 2008 are first; that there are a comparatively large number of 
Chinese investments in the manufacturing sector. These dominate in textiles and 
chemicals. In particular, there are six large projects within mining services and 
construction.292 
Since 2010, Egypt and China have enjoyed speedy development in 
economic and trade cooperation. According to the Chinese ambassador to Egypt 
Song Aiguo, bilateral trade between China and Egypt reached a record high of 
$11.6 billion in 2014, representing an increase of 96 percent compared to 2009. 
Moreover, in the first three quarters of 2015, reciprocal trade amounted to $9.67 
billion, an increase of 13 percent year-on-year, making Egypt China’s third 
biggest trade partner on the African continent.293 Through around 1,213 Chinese 
companies investing in the sectors of construction, industry, and services, China 
ranks fourth among investing countries in Egypt,  
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The turning point in bilateral relations was Xi’s state visit to Egypt in 
January 2016 when the two countries were celebrating the 60th anniversary of 
establishing diplomatic relations he emphasizes on the huge potential for 
commercial initiatives between the two countries. In course of the visit, the two 
countries signed 21 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) aimed at ramping up 
Chinese investments in Egypt with diverse fields of economic cooperation. As of 
the end of 2016, the two countries are currently planning 15 projects in electricity, 
infrastructure, and transport with investments that could total $15 billion.294  
In 1994 Egyptian exports to China was US$10.6 million which is increased 
toUS$342.5million in 2008. The crucial point is that the growth rate has been 
characterizing by sharp fluctuations. The negative growth rate, of 40.8 % in 1995, 
was reborn into a rocket increase within the following two years, valued at 22.1 in 
1996 and 118.3 %, in 199. Exports from Egypt to China declined by around 48 % 
in 1998, as compared to 1997, and this was followed by continued ups and downs 
til they recorded their peak of 449.1 % in 2002. Over 2007-2008, exports from 
Egypt to China climbed from US$129.1 million to US$342.5 million, recording 
an increased rate of 165.2 %. 
In fact, Chinese exports into the Egypt market have shown comparative 
stability. They increased from US$194.4 million in 1994 to nearly US$642.5 
million in 2000, or 230.4 % larger than their value in 1994. After registering 
slight declines during 2001-2003, Chinese exports to Egypt have been 
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continuously increasing, while they climbed from US$675.3 in 2004 to more than 
US$4.4 billion in 2008, representing an increased rate of about 656 %.295 
Egypt's Exports to China reached $70.8 million with 0.4% of total exports 
in July/March 2016/2017 and for import $3283.0 million with 7.4% of total 
imports as the highest country. The volume of trade between the two countries 
reached $3353.8 million with 5.6% as the third partner after the United Arab 
Emirates and the U.S respectively.296  
Although it is quite obvious that China’s exports to Egypt have been far 
greater than its imports from Egypt, resulting in a large trade surplus in favor of 
China. But we can strongly argue that China is a very important trade partner for 
Egypt. 
Furthermore, Chinese firms view Egypt as a business environment with 
significant profit potential, and thus many are willing to participate in major 
projects in Egypt, such as nuclear energy, electricity, petroleum, natural gas, 
railways, ports, mining, construction materials, chemical and optical industries, 
textile, electrical appliances, and other fields.297  
In April 2014, an MOU and a preliminary agreement were signed between 
Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AICC) and Egypt’s Ministry of 
Transportation to develop an 80- kilometer electric railway from El-Salam City to 
Sharqeya and Belbeis in greater Cairo. This line will also connect the third metro 
line presently under construction in Cairo. The project will finance by The 
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Chinese firm through the loan that will be due over a 20-year period, with an 
estimated cost at $ 800 million; the railway will take three years to complete.298 
In December 2014, Egypt signed an initial agreement with China Harbor 
Engineering Company (CHEC) to construct a high-speed train project line 
covering the 900- kilometer distance between Alexandria and Aswan, close to 
Egypt’s border with Sudan. The project would cost $10 billion, and the train’s 
speed would reach 350 kilometers per hour, allowing it to cover the distance 
between Egypt’s the two cities in three to four hours. Egypt will contribute 20 
percent of the labor the project will require, local materials, and executive 
oversight.299 
The energy sector is one of the most important fields of cooperation 
between the two countries. In 2015, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum, together 
with China’s Star Oil & Gas (SOG), established an International Drilling 
Materials Manufacturing Company. The Chinese company will invest $250 
million to establish a seamless pipe rolling mill to supply the entire MENA 
market. This joint venture demonstrates Chinese firms’ activities in the Egyptian 
energy sector, also China’s aspirations to use Egypt as a hub to branch into 
alternative markets within the region.300  
The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Egyptian 
Nuclear Power Plant Authority (NPPA) signed an MOU for nuclear energy 
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cooperation in May 2015 that might open a second overseas marketplace for 
Chinese nuclear power technology.301 
One of the largest solar panel manufacturers in the world (Yingli Solar), 
Chinese solar energy company and photovoltaic, signed a MOU with Egypt’s 
Ministry of Electricity and Energy In 2015, for development of a solar energy 
plant in which they established a target of 50 gigawatts of total solar photovoltaic 
(PV) capacity for local consumption in the following three years.302  
In January 2016, Egypt signed a MoU with China Railway Construction 
Corporation (CRCC) to construct a sixth metro line in Cairo. The 30-kilometer 
metro line will start from New Maadi in southern Cairo to Al-Khosous in Al 
Qalyubia, with a total of 24 stations and an estimated 1.5 million passengers daily. 
The estimated cost of the project around $3.5 billion, the financing of which 
remains under negotiation between the two parties.303  
Minister of Commerce and Industry Tariq Qabeel said there are huge 
opportunities for Chinese automakers to compete in the Egyptian market in the 
field of electric bus production, especially in light of the current trend of the 
Egyptian government to introduce environmentally friendly electric car 
technology to operate in Egypt. This came during a meeting with Chinese 
Ambassador Song Iguo to discuss means of enhancing the Egyptian-Chinese 
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economic relations in various fields of investment, especially in industrial 
sectors.304 
Han Ping, the Economic and Commercial Counselor of the Chinese 
Embassy in Cairo mentions that the second phase of the Egyptian-Chinese 
industrial zone in Ain Sokhna (TEDA) has been finalized and is prepared to 
receive investors as some Chinese firms have already signed business 
contracts. Ping added that the second phase of China-Egypt TEDA Suez 
Economic and Trade Cooperation zone will contain a motorbike company, a 
textiles city, and a logistics center. Ping highlight that the volume of investments 
is predictable to hit $ 2 billion within the few years, on the same truck companies 
that have already operated in the first phase project like Jushi in fiberglass 
industry have reached a production of 200,000 tons annually. 305 
In 2018, Dr. Sahar Nasr Minister of Investment and International 
Cooperation met with a delegation from the Chinese Government, 8 major 
Chinese companies and China Fortune Land Development Co., Ltd (CFLD) 
specialized in the establishment of new cities during their visit to Egypt at MIIC 
premises. On the other hand, MIIC launched an investment map, including all 
investment opportunities in various areas in Egypt’s governorates, developed in 
coordination with all line ministries, mentioned the Minister, who called on 
Chinese companies to identify Egypt’s distinguished investment opportunities and 
benefit from the incentives of the Investment Law. During the meeting, Chinese 
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companies expressed their keenness on injecting new investments in the Egyptian 
market during the upcoming period. On his part, Vice-Chairman of Sinoma 
Chinese Company Mr. Liu Zhijiang asserted that his company was determined to 
invest in Egypt through establishing an iron and steel factory with a production 
capacity of 2 million tons annually and with investments worth approximately 
USD 100 million. 306 
In 2018, Dr. Amr Talaat, Minister of Communications and Information 
Technology, meet with Song Aiguo, Ambassador of China in Cairo. During the 
meeting, Dr. Amr Talaat emphasized the active role of the Chinese companies 
operating in the Egyptian market in the field of telecommunications and 
manufacturing of optical fiber, smart meters, and other related industries.307 
On the other hand, for the tourism field, Egypt has been awarded as one of 
the top ten tourist destinations in the Chinese tourist market in terms of high-
quality tourist destinations. 308 The number of Chinese tourists visiting Egypt has 
improved by 94% during the year 2017, compared to the same period last year, 
according to Xinhua News Agency. In line with statistics issued by the Egyptian 
Embassy in Beijing, during the first five months of the ongoing year, 2017, 
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Chinese tourists visiting Egypt reached 150 thousand. 309  Chairman of the 
Egyptian Investment Group in China, Hany al-Sharqawy, and President of the 
Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce, Benjamin Wan, signed a contract 
on Wednesday in an effort to attract one million Chinese tourists. According to 
the agreement, state-owned and private-sector tourism companies will organize 
tourist trips for 350,000 Chinese tourists for the remainder of the year, to reach 
one million tourists in 2018.310 
For the construction field, the construction of the Central Business District 
(CBD) engaged by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) 
in Egypt's new administrative capital. Chang Weicai, the chief executive officer 
of the CSCEC Egypt Company, told Xinhua onsite that the construction is 
expected to be finished within 3.5 years, adding that over 90 percent of workers 
will be hired locally. Moreover, The Chinese contribution in a large national 
project in Egypt has reflected the Asian power's commitment toward Egypt and 
signaled the historical ties between the two countries, said Diaa Helmy, secretary 
general of the Cairo-based Egyptian-Chinese Commerce Chamber.311 We have to 
mention also that the share of African workers in Chinese infrastructure projects 
on the continent is often perceived to be too low, but the case is different with 
Egypt as over 90 percent of workers will be hired locally as required by local 
regulation.  
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Egypt and China are set to start building a satellite called Misr Sat 2. The 
project aims to send satellite technology in Egypt and benefit from China's 
experience in remote sensing. China is not one of the countries that are keen to 
preserve the secrets of this technology. Cairo hopes that China will allow it to 
participate in the manufacture of the satellite through the introduction of local 
components up to 50%, which contributes to the acquisition of significant 
expertise in this area in the long term. Egypt is in dire need of this satellite for 
security purposes related to monitoring the country's borders, and stop the 
infiltration of terrorist elements and arms smuggling.312 
During the participation in The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) in Beijing on September 2018, Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Minister of 
Electricity, signed conditional contracts for the coal, pumping and storage plants, 
revealing that these contracts are conditional upon the approval of the Egyptian 
and Chinese parties on all items related to the project to start implementation. The 
contract includes construction of a 6,000 MW power station and a 2400 MW 
power plant with total investments of $ 8 billion and $ 700 million.313 
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Minister of Commerce and Industry Eng. Amr Nassar said that the 
government seeks to make Egypt a regional center for Chinese investments. He 
pointed out that the multiplicity of presidential visits between Egypt and China is 
a great evidence of the strength of bilateral relations and their desire to develop 
this relationship. The minister pointed out that the government will work during 
the coming period to reduce the trade deficit between Egypt and China by 
working on several axes. He pointed out that the value of Egyptian exports to 
China was doubled in 2017 to reach about 1.3 billion dollars against about 500 
million dollars in 2016, Valued at $ 776 million, or 139.8%. 
Egypt has started to direct more exports to the Chinese market, especially 
the Egyptian exports of agricultural crops, where many steps have been taken to 
implement more Egyptian agricultural crops in the Chinese market. A protocol of 
cooperation between the two countries was signed to allow Egypt's grape exports 
to China in November 2017; the grapes are the second Egyptian agricultural crops 
after the citrus fruit to enter the Chinese market. Egyptian citrus exports to China 
have witnessed a remarkable development over the past year, rising from $ 23 
million in 2016 to $ 78.3 million in 2017, which reflects the status of Egyptian 
citrus in the Chinese market and gives an opportunity for more exports of other 
Egyptian agricultural crops to the Chinese market.314 
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➢ In order to figure out if China’s Belt and Road Initiative could be 
the rescue plan for Egypt economy we designed our conclusion on 
the expectation for Egypt’s political and economic situation which 
is based on two assumptions; 
First, the Egyptian people have the ability to ignite another revolution. 
However, we can argue that Egypt’s modern history was witnessed numerous 
revolutions which is mean that Egyptian people have the capabilities and the 
practical practice to implement it again. But why?  
The Egyptian government faces a lot of challenges to meet the continuing 
demands of Egyptians after the 2011 uprising in Egypt; many of the demands of 
protesters remain unmet. We also have to take in the consideration that the Youth 
was the main engine for the 2011 revolution.  And the youth still did not have 
anything to lose, not a social position in society or a good job. Young people, as a 
result, became increasingly frustrated and upset. 
In last Egypt’s presidential election as all credible challengers were barred, 
arrested or withdrew before campaigning began, the election was widely seen as a 
referendum on the policies that defined El-Sisi’s first term: combating terrorism 







and reviving the economy. Although El-Sisi cruised to a second term as Egypt’s 
president, and he has create a few stability to the country,  however his popularity 
has been eroded by tough economic reforms that have hit people’s livelihoods 
laborious and by suppression on dissidents. 
        Egypt has been ruled with military authoritarianism since 1952 and has 
seen only four leaders in 59 years. The short period of democracy trial finished 
with the 30 June revolution in 2013, which proved the military dominance over 
the politics, economy, and media with an increase in repressive measures. One 
can easily draw a correlation between military rule after the 2013 coup (revolution) 
and the massive drop in the economy and living status. External debt has risen 
from $38bn to quite $80bn, a lot of funded by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
therefore the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Taxes have skyrocketed after 
the regime opted for enormous tax hikes to all products and services. The 
horridness of the regime changing into frighteningly clearer by the day, 
Lawlessness and police abuse of citizens is the norm. Disappearances, common 
torture, and a tool of choice all this is done in the name of fighting terrorism and 
an Islamic-based armed rebellion. However, as befits a venerable pattern of 
authoritarianism, there's continually time to repress and frighten any regime 
critics, real or imaginary. 
Second, the Egypt government could success in implementing a bold and 
transformational reforms program that will enhance the country’s business 
environment and staging a balanced and inclusive growth. As, Both the IMF and 
World Band expects an increase in Egypt economic growth in 2019 and also 
predicts a decline in Egypt’s unemployment rate. 
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      On balance, Egypt's Giant Zohr Gas Production will achieve “self-
sufficiency of natural gas, ease the burden on the state budget and cut the 
imports bill with potential for a lucrative export market in the future. The New 
Suez Canal achieved direct unstopped transit in the two directions and stepping up 
the permissible draft to 66ft all through the Suez Canal. Also, the revenues 
expected to increase to $ 13.226 billion in 2023; almost 259% that shall certainly 
to improve Egypt’s national income. On the other hand, Investors looking for 
exposure to the Middle East and Africa will need to build in exposure to Egypt, as 
it's one of the largest countries in the region both by population and economy. The 
Egypt government launched the new investment law with guarantees and various 
incentives for investors. However, Egypt launched mega projects such as (New 
Capital, New Al Amria City, The Golden Triangle, Al Galala City and Tourist 
Compound, East Al Ismailia City, and the Suez Canal Economic Zone) in order to 
attract local and foreign capital to the diverse investment opportunities in Egypt. 
➢ My expectation about the impact of the BRI in Egypt’s economic 
and foreign policy it has been divided into two perspectives that is 
also enhance and trigger off Sisi administration to consider 




The Egyptian Chinese relations achieved flourishing Substrates for mutual 
external politics that were counted as pillars that helped continuity as:  
- The mutual respect for legal politics by keeping the principle of noninterference 
in interior affairs  
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- Keeping political autonomous support as while China was calling for 
peaceful living, Egypt was one amongst the Founding countries of the non-
aligned movement within the frame of the international non-aligned movement to 
stand up the influences of the two great power. 
- Keeping the continuity of the bilateral relation developmental function 
by supporting the increase of commerce exchange size.  
Egypt was looking for alternative strategic alliances, following the 
deterioration of its relations with the US due to Washington’s attempts to 
“interfere” in Egypt’s internal affairs after the Arab uprisings. For Cairo, the 
"comprehensive strategic partnership" with Beijing constituted a significant shift 
in its foreign policy orientation, after its decades-long, US-centric policies. On the 
other hand, China’s non-interventionist approach was welcomed by decision-
makers in Cairo. 
Cairo the second-largest recipient of military aid from the U.S, It is 
important to mention that the U.S., through its military aid to Egypt, has achieved 
leverage and influence over the Egyptian military as well as over the Egyptian 
political life. Therefore, China and Egypt may seek to support their military 
relationship and have even given signs that China is looking for supplanting the 
U.S. as Egypt’s major military partner, if China truly aspires to take over the role 
played by the U.S., it will need to become Egypt’s top military supplier, and that 
is unlikely to happen any time soon. However, U.S remains firmly positioned to 
retain its strategic leverage over Egypt within the predictable future. But China 
and Egypt may start military exercises soon especially after the establishment of 
the first Chinese military base in Djibouti as China will need also to protect its 
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economic rout in the north of the Red Sea through Suez Canal. Moreover, it will 
be a good opportunity for Sisi administration to support their policy for fighting 
against terrorism. As the high-level meetings between Chinese and Egyptian 
leaders is a significant evidence for symbolizing the importance of the strategic 
partnership between the two countries. 
The BRI would enhance the security of energy supply lines to China, But 
China would still need to step up its security footprint—whether establishing new 
naval bases by maritime choke points (e.g., Gwadar, Djibouti), increasing its UN 
peacekeeping presence to guard infrastructure workers and investments (e.g., 
South Sudan), improve security cooperation with countries. As Egypt could be the 
next base.  
Finally, we can get to the conclusion that since President Naser until 
President Sisi Strategic cooperation with China was always alternatives to the U.S, 
as cooperation with Beijing suits Cairo’s desire to forge a sovereign foreign 
policy. In addition, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the rescue plan for Egypt 
economy. 
Economic perspective 
Economic interests are the primary consideration in the burgeoning 
comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, as in other key 
countries that will greatly involve Chinese cooperation in infrastructure projects, 
with additional investment in industrialization. Egypt’s desire to develop its own 
economy, attached to China’s economic restructuring, create numerous 
opportunities for both countries to carry out infrastructure construction and 
capacity cooperation. Consequently, if Egypt continues to benefit from superior 
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Chinese investment, it may well considerably decrease economic dependence on 
Washington within this decade. 
 
In fact, the relationship between Egypt and China has not 
continuously been smooth, and there stay behind some serious issues, like the 
trade imbalance since the 1980s, which has worsened considerably over time and 
without determined corrective action, seems set to distort further Egypt’s overall 
trade balance in future. However, the new era of the relation between the two 
countries, especially after the BRI initiative, open the door for Egypt to attract a 
massive foreign direct investment from China which in somehow will reduce the 
pressure on the trade imbalance.   
Furthermore, Egypt’s exports enter two main destinations, which are the 
USA and EU, Egypt has a strong need to open new markets for its exports and 
diversify export destinations so as to avoid the political and economic 
issues related to the geographic concentration in foreign trade. China offers a 
probably giant market for Egyptian products. China’s demand for imports 
can still rise. So, Egypt and China ought to explore the possibility of signing a 
Free Trade Agreement sooner. 
In point of fact, it is expected that Beijing will benefit in turn by gaining a 
foothold in the MENA region and beyond. This could be of vital importance to 
Chinese economic interests, particularly with its BRI initiative, Given Egypt’s 
geostrategic significance, open economy, and relatively cheap labor force. 
Simultaneously, Egypt holds an important geographic position as a trading 
location (with access to European, US, African and Arab markets). The position 
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of the SCZone at a major port area, with access via the Suez to Europe, is of 
obvious significance. The involvement of significant infrastructural investment in 
transportation, utilities, communication, and buildings, moreover, is perhaps 
illustrative of the strategic trade importance China places on the zone. 
Much has been made of China’s grand building plan for the BRI Initiative. 
Egypt has the chance to function as the “hub” for the BRI into Africa and the 
Middle East. The Chinese have already selected it as one of the top 5 countries for 
acquisitions and mergers potential over the following 5 years. The Suez Canal 
Economic Zone (SCZone) could play a significant role for China as well by 
transferring Chinese production to the nations with substantial imports, it may be 
possible to decrease the growing trade deficits: “The booming expansion of 
China’s exports has been increasingly inflicting a protectionist reaction in many 
host countries, that has prompted China to substitute direct investments for 
exports. 
For the tourism field, Egypt is one of the most important countries in the 
world attractive to Chinese tourists due to its originality and history. The Chinese 
tourist market to Egypt is very important for Egypt economy, the problem is the 
lack of sufficient airlines to transport the number of tourists, due to the lack of 
charter flights between the two countries, the increase in the number of flights and 
the diversity of means of transportation between China and Egypt will raise the 
number of Chinese tourists. Possibly investors and businessmen will be offered 
the opportunity to launch an airline to operate these flights. 




For the overall motivations of China BRI, we can say that BRI has become 
the focal point of China’s national strategy. The initiative has typically been 
painted as “grandiose” or “truly monumental”. In accordance with its 
doubtless vast impact, the initiative has aroused immense interest, both 
economically as well as politically. 
The initiative aims to enhance the connectivity of Asian, European and 
African continents and their adjacent seas to promote a free flow of economic 
factors, efficiently allocate resources and deeply integrate markets. China aims to 
become the hub to connect the energetic East Asia economic at one end and 
developed European economic at the other. 
In the BRI Initiative, there are more than 100 countries and international 
organizations participating at different stages. The widespread desire to 
participate in this project shows that the involved countries believe in the positive 
effects that may be achieved by partnering with China. However, growing Sino-
European monetary ties largely explain the decision by the UK, France, Germany, 
and Italy, to join as founding members the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), seen as a potential rival to the World Bank, despite US pressure to stay 
out. China continues to be a developing country with only one-seventh of the 
US’s per capita GDP. China has neither the flexibility nor the requirement to 
defend and lead globalization alone. Seeking Europe as a partner is 
incredibly necessary. The BRI Initiative is an open proposal from China to 
Europe and all countries in the world, to forge a platform for diversified 
cooperation. The objective of the Belt and Road Initiative is a topic heavily 
debated by academia, think tanks, and public media since its birth. Some scholars 
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are inclined to interpret the BRI as China’s new grand strategy with security and 
military aspirations. 
Although it remains to be seen how successful BRI will be, The BRI faces 
great challenges that need to be assessed in order to avoid negative impacts on 
China’s domestic economy and foreign policy. In the economic field, the risk lies 
in the provision of a huge amount of financial resources to low-return projects and 
high-risk countries 
The United States has raised concerns about the strategic implications 
behind China’s BRI initiative, pointing out that China aims to change the 
international order through the creation of new international organizations. By 
contrast, China has argued that it does not seek to change the current international 
order but rather it tries to complement the international order through the 
establishment of new organizations. The American perspective considers BRI 
overseas bases as a tool to enhance China’s sphere of influence and brings smaller 
countries under China’s sphere of influence. 
 
On the other hand, The Maritime Silk Road represents the greatest 
challenge for the implementation of the BRI due to the South China Seas 
territorial disputes and China’s overseas bases along the maritime line. The realist 
perspective considers the Maritime Silk Road and its overseas bases as a strategy 
to increase China’s influence in the region. However, in the next years, China 
needs to provide further shreds of evidences that confirm the liberal perspective 
over the realist one, demonstrating that the BRI infrastructure developments along 





This great potential of the Initiative contains internal and external 
challenges that could backfire, provoking “blind development” and political 
destabilization. China has advanced the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model 
for the execution of BRI projects. But, the public coffers of the LDCs are 
inadequate to invest in the proposed large-scale projects, and also the private 
sectors in most of the LDCs do not have the capacity to invest and carry out such 
projects. This leaves the partner countries to take loans through Chinese banks 
and China-led multilateral financing institutions such as Asian Infrastructure and 
Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank under the BRICS, China 
Development Bank and Exim Bank of China. Needless to mention, the loans 
received are to be paid back in a definite period of time. If the BRI projects result 
in higher trade volume, there will be a win-win situation. Otherwise, it will add a 
financial burden to the LDCs pushing them into the external debt crisis. It is also 
to be taken into account that the LDC economies are typically prone to various 
risks such as foreign exchange risk, a risk of recession and risk of commodity 
price volatility; and are plagued by structural and institutional inefficiencies 
including lack of pre-existing infrastructure and corruption.  
Simultaneously, Chinese contractors and investors can realize themselves 
working across a growing variety of BRI countries. Success in one country 
doesn’t necessarily imply success in another, particularly wherever legal and 
regulative variations are significant. To create really international businesses, 
Chinese firms will need to depend on skilled advisers and local partners to 
navigate these ambiguous and conflicting legal and regulative variations. 
Lastly for the motivations of China BRI initiative in the Middle East,  
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First, we have to mention that, China has developed cultural diplomacy 
with Middle Eastern countries through various channels such as government, 
academia, business, civilian contacts, research and educational training, social 
activities, religion, finance, and communication and media at various levels. 
China’s demand for imported oil, natural gas, and coal is expected to rise 
by 60% by 2010 and 2035. So that, China is functioning on securing supply lines 
connecting China to the Middle East and Africa. So, if Beijing’s BRI strategy 
comes to fruition, it will be a catalyst for shifting power alliances and the 
changing fortunes of nation states. First, China desires to play an additional 
important role in security issues within the Middle East, to point out its 
responsibilities and capabilities as a rising power. Second, China conjointly hopes 
to obtain economic and cultural profits from its interactions with the Middle East. 
       On the other hand, China’s growing role in the Middle East can be 
seen as signs of an opportunistic long game to fill the “vacuum” left there by the 
United States under the Obama and Trump administrations However, these 
actions are more accurately understood as incremental steps that represent a 
deepening investment in a strategic region. 
As such we witnessed China step up its regional profile early last year 
when President Xi visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, and released its first 
Arab Policy Paper to gesture its goal of increased engagement in the Mideast. By 
the side of the eighth ministerial meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation 
Forum. Chinese President Xi announced that China and the Arab countries had 
approved to establish a "Sino-Arab future-oriented strategic partnership of 
comprehensive cooperation and common development."Calling the Arab states 
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China's natural partners in Belt and Road cooperation. Xi added that China stands 
ready to work with the Arab side to coordinate the development strategies and 
actions."We must strive to uphold peace and stability in the Middle East. Xi said 
that China and the Arab states have to strengthen strategic trust, stay committed to 
dialogue and consultation, uphold the principle of sovereignty, champion 
inclusive reconciliation and fight terrorism. 
China’s interests in the Mideast because a source of energy, providing 
more than half of China’s crude oil imports. It is also a hub for market access in 
Europe and Africa, and the region is a forward front for counter-terrorism, 
especially for China and other Asian states that continue to count on the Mideast 
for energy imports. Fundamentally, they need security and regional stability of 
supply lines. 
In addition, China has demonstrated increasing concern over the threat 
exhibit by the Islamic State and its need to remain the threat far from China’s 
borders. With the rise of deadly extremism, both countries face exceptional 
security challenges. Thus, both seek to combat terrorism and extremism by 
providing intelligence, arresting and repatriating suspects, collecting evidence, 
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일대일로의 영향: 이집트 경제와 외교 정책 
 
이 논문은 일대일로가 이집트 경제 및 대외 정책에 가져오는 기대 효과를 
조사합니다. 일대일로는 중국 국가전략의 중심에 있습니다. 그러나 일대일로의 
탄생부터 그것의 목적은 싱크 탱크, 학계 및 대중 매체에 의해 심도 있게 
논의되어왔다. 
이 연구는 중국 정부의 일대일로 계획의 시작인 2013 년부터 최근까지의 
외국인직접투자의 동향을 조사합니다. 중국의 경우 이집트를 전략적인 관점에서 
더욱더 바라보았습니다. 중국의 다른 중동 파트너들과의 관계와는 다르게 
이집트와의 관계는 석유의 수입이 바탕이 되지 않고 지리적인 계산이 바탕이 
됩니다. 중국은 오랫동안 유럽으로 수출을 할 때 수에즈 운하를 주된 운송경로로 
이용해왔습니다. 결과적으로 중국은 수십 년 동안 이 핵심적인 운하에서 입지를 
강화하기를 희망하였습니다. 
이 연구는 이집트의 정치적인 현황, 이집트 혁명의 역사, 아랍의 봄, 그리고 2011 년 
이집트 혁명의 동기에 대하여 살펴봅니다. 또한 이집트 경제의 전망, 이집트의 
공적개발원조, 그리고 이집트의 경제적, 정치적, 사회적 문제에 대하여 설명합니다. 
이 연구는 더 나아가 중국과 이집트간의 포괄적인 전략적 파트너십에 대한 동기를 
특히 약화되고 분배된 미국의 중동 국가에 대한 권력을 중심으로 살펴봅니다. 
중국은 중동에 발판을 마련함으로써 성공적으로 이득을 취할 수 있습니다. 
이 연구는 이집트가 일대일로를 아프리카와 중동 지역에 연결해주는 허브역할을 
함으로써 상당한 이득을 취할 수 있다는 점을 발견했습니다. 중국은 이미 5 년 내에 
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인수합병 시 잠재력이 가장 높은 상위 5 개국 중 하나로 이집트를 선정했습니다. 
이집트는 인수합병 대상 나라 .또한 수에즈 운하 경제 수역은 수입이 상당한 
나라들에게 중국의 생산품을 전달해주는 역할을 할 수 있습니다. 
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